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FINANCIAL OPTIONS IN THE REAL WORLD: AN
ECONOMIC AND TAX ANALYSIS
DAVID HASEN*
ABSTRACT
Many of the consequences of issuing and purchasing options on publicly traded property
have been well understood since Black and Scholes developed a model for option pricing. No
model of options, however, provides an accurate economic analysis of the actual transactions
that issuers and purchasers engage in when options are bought and sold. One consequence
of this gap in understanding is that the rules for taxing options remain poorly developed.
This Article provides a transactional analysis of option sales for the first time. The focus
is on covered options, but the analysis also has implications for options in which the underlying property serves merely as a reference obligation and is owned by neither party to the
transaction. The analysis demonstrates that while all options have as one component a
swap of variable risks or returns on the underlying property for a fixed payment, “in the
money” options involve, in addition, a forward transfer of the benefits and correlative burdens of a part of the underlying property that is equivalent to a forward sale of that part.
Commentators have not identified this embedded forward sale because the payment arrangement between the parties to the option transaction obscures it; however, a comparison
of option prices derived under the Black-Scholes model with the theoretical prices of such
forwards demonstrates that the transactions are identical. The analysis also illuminates the
relationships between options and other common financial transactions, such as collars,
and it permits a clear assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of possible tax rules
for financial options.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The treatment of options is a vexed area in the tax law. At its
most basic, an option is a contract between two parties under which
one of them purchases from the other the right, but not the obligation, to purchase or sell property (an “underlier”) at a fixed price (the
“strike price”) on a particular date in the future (the “exercise date”
or “strike date”).1 Long subject to “open-transaction” treatment, the
sale of an option represents one of the few cases in which money can
change hands in a commercial setting without triggering any immediate income tax consequences.2 Instead, the grantor of an option typically includes nothing in income on receipt of payment for the option
(the “option premium”), while the option purchaser is entitled neither
to an immediate deduction of the option premium3 nor to amortize
the premium prior to the exercise date.4 Further, unless it is highly
likely on the option sale date that the option will be exercised,5 no
sale of the underlier is deemed to have occurred for tax purposes on
sale of the option, even though, in economic terms, the option sale is
often similar to a partial sale of the underlier. Instead, tax consequences first arise when something further happens in respect of the
option, such as its exercise,6 lapse, cancellation, or disposition.7

1. JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 179-184 (7th ed.
2009).
2. See Va. Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm’r, 99 F.2d 919, 921-22 (4th Cir. 1938); see
also Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C. B. 265; 26 U.S.C. § 1234 (2006). The other major exception
to the taxation of cash on receipt rule is the nontaxation of loan proceeds. Cases in which a
non-cash exchange of property for property goes untaxed are more common. They include
exchanges of certain like-kind properties, 26 U.S.C. § 1031, and the contribution of property to a controlled corporation in exchange for the corporation’s stock, 26 U.S.C. § 351(a), or
to a partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership. 26 U.S.C. § 721.
3. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
4. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.263(a)-(4)(c)(1)(iii)(E).
5. Rev. Rul. 80-238, 1980-2 C.B. 96.
6. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B.265 .
7. 26 U.S.C. § 1234A.
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Most commentators view this regime as incorrect,8 but beyond
that partial consensus little agreement exists on how the tax law
should apply to options. Options have been variously described as, or
as analogous to, services transactions,9 carved-out property interests,10 partnerships,11 amounts received under a claim of right,12 instances of “dynamic hedging,”13 and wagers.14 Each of these characterizations would theoretically support a different set of rules for option taxation. Each has virtues, but none is fully satisfactory. For example, under the carved-out interest approach, the option sale would
be viewed as its own complete disposition of a contingent property interest, regardless of whether the option was exercised. This approach
has intuitive appeal for call options, which give the option purchaser
the right to buy property, but in the case of a put option, where the
option purchaser acquires the right to dispose of the underlier, it is
difficult to see how the disposition on the option sale date of what appears to be a potential liability counts as a property transaction. Similarly, under a claim of right analysis, the option premium might be
viewed not as part of a property transaction, but as a separate transaction creating income for the option grantor because the premium is
not subject to limitation on its use by the recipient.15 Under such an
analysis, the premium would be immediately includible in income,
though possibly subject to adjustment later on. Immediate inclusion
seems to be a sensible result, except that amounts received on condition of providing a service or subject to a future obligation generally
are not treated as received under a claim of right,16 though they
might be taxable on other grounds.17 Further, where the option is
“deep in the money” and so highly likely to be exercised, the option
sale appears to be more analogous to a forward sale of the underlier
8. See, e.g., Eric D. Chason, Naked and Covered in Monte Carlo: A Reappraisal of Option Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 135, 138-39 (2007); Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H.
Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A “Revolutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX
L. REV. 725, 775-76 (1992); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Income from Writing Options, 96
TAX NOTES TODAY 201-54 (1996); Yoram Keinan, United States Federal Taxation of Derivatives: One Way or Many?, 61 TAX LAW. 81, 146-57 (2007). But see Kevin J. Liss, Rationalizing the Taxation of Options in the Age of Derivatives, 61 TAX LAW. 855, 856 (2008) (arguing
that holding option transactions open for tax purposes until exercise, lapse, disposition or
cancellation is correct).
9. Johnson, supra note 8, at 6.
10. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 8, at 780-81.
11. Bruce Kayle, Realization Without Taxation? The Not-So-Clear Reflection of Income
From an Option to Acquire Property, 48 TAX L. REV. 233, 277 (1993).
12. Id. at 248-54.
13. David M. Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 429-49 (2004).
14. Liss, supra note 8, at 856-57.
15. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
16. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279.
17. See, e.g., Schlude v. Comm’r, 372 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1962) (requiring an accrualmethod taxpayer to include sums paid for dance lessons to be provided in the future).
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than to a payment subject to a claim of right. Comparable difficulties
arise under the remaining characterizations mentioned above.
Prior to the advent of modern financial products, the failure of the
tax law to tax options correctly (for those who so view the current
rules) amounted to little more than an irritation. Options were relatively uncommon, tended to be short-lived, and typically were not entered into for tax avoidance purposes.18 In short, even if options were
wrongly taxed, not much hung in the balance. This relatively tolerable state of affairs no longer holds. Modern financial products have
rendered options ubiquitous,19 have made the choice to purchase or
sell them depend in many cases solely upon tax considerations, and
have extended the terms of many options to economically significant
periods.20 At least three significant problems in option taxation have
emerged as a consequence. First, under the current regime, a large
class of taxpayers is taxed incorrectly in ways that are economically
significant, simply because the option premium goes untaxed for a
significant period of time. Second, because the open transaction doctrine differs so dramatically from the accrual or accrual-type regimes
commonly applied to other, similar financial instruments,21 taxpayers
can elect their tax treatment at little if any economic cost. For example, a taxpayer seeking an immediate deduction for an option-like
premium can enter into an economically similar notional principal
contract that permits deduction of the option premium-like payment
over time, whereas the same taxpayer can purchase a conventional
and economically similar option if deferral of the deduction is preferable. Third, and in a related vein, taxpayers can opt into tax arbitrage without much difficulty through the expedient of entering into
arrangements that largely offset for economic purposes but not for
tax purposes. Amplifying on the previous example, a taxpayer might
purchase an option-like notional principal contract that generates
current deductions while selling an economically similar option in return for an option premium that is not taxed in the current period.
Added to these difficulties is the fact that much of the justification
for the wait-and-see regime under the open transaction doctrine does
not carry over to financial options anyway. Formerly, option purchases tended to be associated with transactions in unique underlying
18. See generally Tony Ware, Financial Derivatives—A Brief Introduction, MITACS
6th Annual Conference, May 11, 2005, available at http://finance.math.ucalgary.ca/papers/
MitacsShortCourse2005.pdf.
19. See generally id.
20. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(f)(3) (addressing the tax consequences of options embedded in notional principal contracts having a multi-period life).
21. In addition to CPDIs, the following instruments are subject to accrual or accrualtype taxation: notional principal contracts, 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3, original issue debt instruments, 26 U.S.C. § 1272, “dealer” property, 26 U.S.C. § 475, certain foreign currency contracts, 26 U.S.C. § 988.
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property,22 and as a consequence the establishment of a financial
equivalent for the option would be difficult if not impossible. In the
typical case, the reason for the option purchase was that at or near
the time of potential purchase of the underlier, some question existed
about whether the purchaser wanted or would be able to acquire or
retain it.23 That decision may not have depended upon objective, readily observable financial information, but on imponderables such as
whether the particular underlier in question best satisfied the purchaser’s personal or business needs or whether financing for the purchase of the underlier would be available.24 An individual might be
willing to buy an antique dresser as long as nothing better was offered at the flea market; Blackacre might suit a farmer’s plans to expand operations, but the availability of a bank loan could be uncertain on the day the property is offered for sale. The purchase of a call
option in either case would enable the prospective buyer to resolve
these contingencies in exchange for a fee. However, quantifying the
economic effect of paying the fee—the premium paid for the option—
to either party in such a situation is a difficult if not impossible task.
In particular, it typically will not be possible to establish a readily
observable value for an option of that kind.
By contrast, modern financial options typically are written on
fungible property, which means that information about the true value of the option is readily available.25 Unlike Blackacre and Whiteacre, there is no material difference between an option on share A of
IBM stock and one with the same terms on share B because there is
no difference in the shares. Consequently, the economic characteristics of the derivative financial option are readily ascertainable, and
worries about mistaxation if valuation occurs on the option purchase
date are largely absent.
These two general phenomena—the failure of the tax law to reach
appropriate rules for the taxation of financial options and the collapse of the practical justifications for applying the open transaction
doctrine to such options—indicate that much is to be gained from an
analysis of financial options that can disclose their actual economics
and explicate how a realization-based income tax should apply to
them. This Article seeks to accomplish these goals through an application of standard and well-understood concepts in the tax law, informed by the Black-Scholes model of option pricing. The primary focus here is so-called “covered options,” or options in which one of the
parties owns the property that is subject to the option. However, the
22. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 175-79 (4th ed. 2004).
23. See id.
24. See generally ROBERT F. BRUNER, APPLIED MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 425 (2004).
25. Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 258-59 (1999).
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analysis also has ramifications for the tax analysis of options that are
mere bilateral contracts because the payout structure of such contracts is the same as that of a covered option. Consequently, the two
types of transactions often are close substitutes for each other. To
give a sense of the tax stakes involved, consider that millions of options contracts having a combined value of several billions of dollars
are traded daily in the United States alone.26
Under the analysis developed here, the purchase of an option is
properly viewed as consisting of the cashing out of a possible gain or
loss, together with (in the case of “in the money” options) a forward
property transaction, where the term property is understood in its
standard tax sense of ownership of the economic benefits and correlative burdens associated with an asset or part of an asset.27 Critically,
this analysis applies equally to put and call options, despite the apparent incongruity of treating the off-loading of risk in the case of the
purchase of a put option as a property disposition. The basic teaching
is that true “option” arrangements arise only to the extent that options are exchanges of fixed for uncertain returns or risks. The balance of any option transaction—that is, the portion that is “in the
money” on the option sale date—is a property transaction. In this
transaction, the opportunity for gain and the risk of loss that straddle the expected value of the underlier on the exercise date are transferred to the party that would formally purchase the underlier (or its
equivalent) on exercise. The fact that in the money options constitute
transfers of risks and correlative burdens explains how options shade
into simple forward contracts as they move deeper into the money on
the option sale date.
So understood, it becomes possible to formulate rules for the taxation of options that respect the lines that exist between the types of
returns options generate. On one hand, out-of-the-money options are
closely akin to the purchase of a service that should be taxed as ordinary income to the option writer, but on the other hand, certain options have property disposition-like characteristics. Without an understanding of how the risk-shifting part of any option shades into
the property-shifting part of some options, it has not been possible to
formulate tax rules that are consistent with both of these aspects of
options. Further, the understanding of options developed in this Article makes it possible to devise rules that are consistent with principles that have long operated in the tax system, particularly the following two: 1) that the taxpayer does not realize the gain or loss as26. In 2008, nearly 1.2 billion options having a total cash value of nearly $1 trillion
were traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. See Chicago Board Options Exchange, CBOE 2008 Market Statistics, at 1, available at http://www.cboe.com/Data/
marketstats-2008.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
27. See Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1243-45 (1981).
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sociated with an asset until the asset is disposed of (known as the
“realization rule”), and 2) that capital income is taxed differently
from ordinary income.28 While the analysis here does not decisively
point to any particular tax regime for options, it suggests that certain
approaches will be more effective and appropriate than others, and it
illustrates the extent to which differing approaches involve, and do
not involve, legitimate trade-offs. The analysis also helps to explain
the flaws in the current law as well as the strengths and weaknesses
of others’ suggestions for the taxation of options.
The approach developed here has eluded commentators because
they typically have not focused on the entire stream of payments in
an option transaction. Instead, commentators have tended to separate the option purchase from the option payout (or lapse), focusing
on the rights delivered on exercise of the option separately from those
involved in the payment of the option premium itself. Stated otherwise, they have let the optics of option transactions drive their analyses. However, once the total sequence of payments in an option
transaction is taken into account, the property transaction inherent
in any in the money option becomes manifest. The portion, if any, of
the option premium that is economically attributable to the in the
money aspect of the option is nothing more than a shift in the timing
of the payouts from ownership of a part of the underlier.
Part II reviews the basic law for the taxation of options. Part III
offers a novel analysis that aspires both to explain the economics of
an option transaction and to clarify the ways in which options are
similar to, but distinct from, the various instruments and arrangements to which others have compared them. The analysis in Part III
relies heavily on the Black-Scholes option pricing model, but it elaborates significantly on the model in its explanation of the on-theground facts that correspond to the results produced under the model. Part IV sets forth possible tax rules for options in light of the economic analysis of options developed in Part III.
II. OPTION BASICS
A. Options Generally
Options come in two basic forms.29 A call option, or “call,” gives the
owner of the option the right but not the obligation to purchase a given item of property at a given price on one or more dates in the future. A put option, or “put,” gives the owner the right but not the obligation to sell a given item of property at a given price on one or
28. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006) (discussing favorable rates for long-term capital gain of individuals); 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (discussing gain or loss on property generally taxed when realized).
29. See generally HULL, supra note 1, at 179-84.
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more dates in the future. In standard parlance, a call option is said to
be “in the money” (“ITM”) at any time that the fair market value of
the underlier exceeds the option exercise price; “at the money”
(“ATM”) if the fair market value equals the exercise price; and “out of
the money” (“OTM”) at any time that the fair market value is less
than the exercise price. Similarly, a put is ITM if the value of the underlier is less than the exercise price, ATM if the values are equal,
and OTM otherwise. Thus, an option will not be exercised if it is
OTM on the exercise date.
The following example demonstrates these concepts.
Simple call option: On Day 1, A pays $Y to B in exchange
for an option to purchase 100 shares of XYZ Company stock
from B at $X on Day 2, one year later.
If the fair market value of 100 shares of XYZ stock on Day 2 exceeds
$X, the option will be ITM, and A will exercise the option; otherwise,
the option will lapse unexercised.30 If the option provided A the right
to sell, rather than to buy, 100 shares of XYZ stock, the option would
be a put and A would exercise only if the fair market value of the
XYZ stock were not greater than $X on Day 2.
Options that may be exercised on just one date are referred to as
European options, while options exercisable on more than one date
are referred to as American options.31 Options also may be either
physically settled or cash settled. A physically settled option requires
the purchase or sale of the underlier to occur if the option is exercised, while a cash settled option is exercised through the option
writer’s transfer of the net option value to the option holder on the
exercise date. In the previous examples, a physical settlement of either option would require the option holder to tender, in the case of
the call, $X to the option writer on Day 2 in order to receive the stock,
or in the case of the put, the underlying XYZ stock in order to receive
$X. If, by contrast, the options were cash-settled, then the holder of
the option would be entitled to a cash payment equal to the difference
between the fair market value of the stock and $X in the case of the
call, or between $X and the fair market value of the stock in the case
of the put. Thus, as contrasted with a physically settled option, neither party to a cash settled option need own the underlier at any
time. Where the underliers are fungible, publicly traded property

30. For ease of exposition. I disregard the case where the option is ATM on the exercise date. In that case, it is a matter of indifference whether the option is exercised or not.
31. HULL, supra note 1, at 179-81.

2010]

FINANCIAL OPTIONS IN THE REAL WORLD

797

such as publicly traded stock, commodities, or futures, the difference
between cash and physical settlement often approaches nil.32
Lastly, options may be contingent in the sense that some condition
beyond the option’s being ITM on the exercise date must be satisfied
in order for the option to be exercisable. In a now common product
known as a credit default swap (a “CDS”), the writer of the swap may
promise to pay for the decline in value of an underlier on one or more
dates, but only when the decline is due to some factor other than
changes to general market conditions.33 In economic terms, a CDS of
this type is economically equivalent to a contingent put option. Most
forms of insurance also are economically equivalent to contingent put
options, as long as the purchaser of the insurance has an insurable
interest in the underlier.34
B. Tax Rules
A welter of rules governs the taxation of options. Some of the
rules are statutory, some are administrative, and some derive from
decisional law.
1. Options Not Subject to Special Rules
The open transaction doctrine applies to options not subject to a
special statutory regime.35 The doctrine itself dates from the 1931
Supreme Court case Burnet v. Logan,36 which did not deal with options but with contingent payment rights. In Logan, the taxpayer
sold an interest in a mining company and received payment in the
form of cash plus rights to a percentage of future mine earnings over
an indefinite period. The Court held that the taxpayer was entitled to
recover her basis in the property sold before reporting any of the
payment for her mining stock as gain from the transaction because
the uncertainty inherent in the timing and amount of future payouts
32. Even where the option is on a commodity such as wheat, physical settlement
commonly occurs in connection with the separate transfer of the underlier to a person in
the trade or business of selling the underlier. Id. at 10.
33. As its name implies, the associated trigger is generally a default of some kind by
the issuer on the reference obligation, or else some similar event such as a downgrade in
the creditworthiness of the issuer of the underlier. See Roberto Blanco et al., An Empirical
Analysis of the Dynamic Relation Between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default
Swaps, 60 J. FIN. 2255, 2256 (2005).
34. As a simple example, homeowner’s insurance is equivalent to a put option on the
home with a strike price equal to the fair market value of the home (or its insured amount,
whichever is less) where the decline in value is due to certain events, such as a fire or a
flood. True insurance relationships also generally require the option holder to have an insurable interest in the underlier. Bertram Harnett & John V. Thornton, Insurable Interest
in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1162,
1162-63 (1948).
35. See Va. Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm’r, 99 F.2d 919, 921-22 (4th Cir. 1938).
36. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413-14 (1931).
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made taxation inappropriate, given that the consequences of the sale
would be determined with certainty in subsequent periods.
In Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner,37 the open
transaction rule was extended to options at the behest of the government. The taxpayer received payments over a three-year period
for an option it had sold to a third party that provided the third party
the right to purchase stock or mineral lands. When the option holder
let the option lapse in 1934, the taxpayer filed amended returns for
the years in which it had received payments, treating the amounts
received as ordinary income in those years.38 The government argued,
and the court agreed, that the open transaction doctrine applied because at the time the payments were received “it was impossible to
determine whether they were taxable or not” and, because the nature
of option payments received in a particular year might first become
ascertainable after the statute of limitations had closed for that year,
only a rule that the taxable event occurred in the year of lapse or exercise would be administrable.39
Although the problem of uncertainty lingering beyond the statute
of limitations motivated the decision in Virginia Iron, the kind of uncertainty that commonly has been considered to justify application of
the open transaction doctrine is that of character of the option premium.40 If the option purchaser exercises its right to buy or sell under
the option, a transfer of property will occur, and it would seem that
the tax consequences attending a property disposition should also
apply to the option sale. That is, the two transactions together appear to constitute a single property disposition and should be so
treated for tax purposes.41 If, however, the option goes unexercised,
then at least in a formal sense no property changes hands, and the
tax consequences of the option sale would seem to differ too, assuming that the tax consequences of nonproperty transactions generally
differ from those of property transactions. Accordingly, because it is
not possible to get the “right” answer with any certainty on the option sale date, it is better to hold the transaction open – that is, to
wait and see.42
Although subsequent developments, both administrative and legislative, have substantially narrowed the scope of application of the
open transaction doctrine,43 the doctrine’s basic rationale—
37. 99 F.2d at 921.
38. Id. at 919-21.
39. Id. at 921-22.
40. See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
41. Id.
42. See Burnet, 283 U.S. at 413, (articulating the justification for the open transaction
doctrine, albeit in a nonoption setting);Va. Iron Coal & Coke Co., 99 F.2d at 919 (extending
the rationale to options).
43. See, e.g., Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(iii).
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uncertainty in the tax consequences of a transaction in the taxable
period—continues to serve as the basis for the tax treatment of most
options.44 Accordingly, under current practice for options not subject
to special rules, receipt of the option premium is a nontaxable
event.45 If the option is exercised, the option writer treats the premium as part of the amount realized in the case of a call and as a reduction in the purchase price in the case of a put. The holder treats
the premium symmetrically, adding the premium to basis in the case
of a call and subtracting the premium from the amount realized in
the case of a put.46 Under the sample transaction above, on exercise
of the call, B would treat $X + $Y as the amount received as payment
for the XYZ stock, and A’s basis in the stock would be the same
amount. If the option were a put, then A’s amount realized and B’s
amount paid would be $X - $Y. The character of any gain or loss recognized is generally the same as that of the underlier in the hands of
the seller of the property.47
When an option is not exercised, or is disposed of in some way prior
to its possible exercise, different rules apply to holders and writers of
options. Holders are generally subject to the rules of § 1234(a), which
provide that gain or loss to the option holder on disposition (including
lapse)48 of the option has the character as short- or long-term capital
that the underlier does or would have in the holder’s hands. If, however, the underlier is or would be inventory or not otherwise a capital asset in the holder’s hands, gain or loss generally will be ordinary.49 The
same rules apply where the option is cancelled by mutual agreement of
the parties (with or without a cancellation payment).50
Writers of options are generally subject to the rules of § 1234(b) when
the option is not (or not yet) exercised. In the case of an option on stock,
securities, or commodities, the disposition, lapse, or cancellation of the
option generally will produce short-term capital gain or loss, unless the
underlier is not a capital asset in the holder’s hands or the option is
granted in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s trade or business of
granting options, in either of which cases gain or loss is ordinary.51

44. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 26 U.S.C. § 1234(a)(2) (2006).
49. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222 (defining capital gain or loss as gain or loss from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset).
50. 26 U.S.C. § 1234A.
51. See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265; 26 U.S.C. § 1234A.
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2. Special Situations
The rules described above do not apply to a variety of options and
persons. Most importantly, under § 475, mark-to-market rules apply
to taxpayers who are either (1) dealers in options,52 or (2) traders in
options who elect to have mark-to-market rules apply to income and
loss from their option transactions, regardless of the nature of the
underlier.53 Under the mark-to-market rules, dealers and electing
traders value, or mark to market, their inventory annually and either
pay tax on the net increase in value of the inventory or take a deduction for the net decrease over the previous year. Gain or loss is ordinary in character.54 In the case of a dealer in options, the mark-tomarket regime means that while open transaction treatment still applies when the option is entered into, the tax system will take into
account the appreciation or decline in value of the option during the
year. Persons in the trade or business of writing options generally
treat option premiums as ordinary income, but again subject to deferral under the open transaction doctrine.55
The rules described in Section II.B.1 also do not apply in a number
of special situations. First, they do not govern options on “section
1256 contracts.”56 Section 1256 contracts comprise a variety of publicly traded financial contracts, most of which are valued on a daily basis by the exchanges on which they are traded.57 Like options held as
inventory or by dealers in securities, section 1256 contracts (some of
which are themselves options), and options on them are subject to a
mark-to-market regime,58 but unlike inventory or dealer property, §
1256 mandates that gain and loss on section 1256 contracts be 40%
short-term capital and 60% long-term capital in character.59
Second, holders of nonexercised put options entered into in connection with certain short sales are subject to § 1233.60 In a short
sale, one party borrows property that it then sells to a purchaser. The
seller later “closes out” the short sale by delivering to the lender
52. Taxpayers who are dealers in securities may hold securities, including options, as
inventory or not. Subject to limited exceptions, if held as inventory, the option is generally
subject to inventory accounting. See 26 U.S.C. § 475(b) (2006); see also 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(1)
(requiring annual fair market valuation of the option). If the option is not held as inventory, essentially the same MTM rules apply. See 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(2).
53. 26 U.S.C. § 475(f).
54. See 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(1) (excluding inventory from the definition of “capital asset” and therefore from capital treatment on sale or exchange).
55. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-46-059 (Aug. 18, 1978) (treating income from option premiums in the case of a person in the trade or business of granting options).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 1234(c)(1). Certain options are themselves “section 1256 contracts.” See
26 U.S.C. § 1256(b)(3)-(4). These too, of course, are subject to the general rules of § 1256.
57. 26 U.S.C. § 1256(g)(4)-(6).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 1256(a)(1).
59. 26 U.S.C. § 1256(a)(3).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 1234(a)(3)(c).
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property identical to the property borrowed. Section 1234(a)(3) provides that the rules of § 1233(c) apply to losses resulting from the
nonexercise of put options described in that section. Section 1233(c)
in turn states that if the taxpayer acquires a put option to sell property on the same date it acquires the property to which the option, if
exercised, will apply, then any loss on the nonexercise of the option is
added to the basis of the property so acquired.
Lastly, the general rules may not apply to situations in which the
option is embedded in another instrument or is treated as part of
another arrangement. Examples of the first situation include the
previously discussed case of an option embedded in an NPC as well
as options embedded in contingent payment debt instruments. For
these instruments, the option premium is generally accounted for
over the term of the instrument on the basis of assumptions about
the returns the option will generate. Any disparity between the projections and the actual returns is accounted for either periodically or
at term. Examples of explicit integration or quasi-integration regimes
include options entered into as hedges,61 as parts of a straddle,62 or in
connection with a wash sale.63 In these cases, the tax treatment of
the option depends in some way on the treatment of the asset or instrument with which it is associated.
C. Problems in Option Taxation
This Subpart identifies some of the difficulties that options pose to
the tax system. The discussion involves variations on the following
basic fact pattern:
Suppose A is the owner of 100 shares of XYZ stock, which
does not pay dividends. On Day 1, A and B enter into an option transaction pursuant to which the option, if exercised,
will result in the transfer of the XYZ stock to B on Day 2,
one year later. The stock is worth $100 on Day 1, and A’s adjusted basis in the stock is $10. As of Day 1, A has held the
XYZ stock for more than one year. XYZ stock has moderate
volatility of 30%. In the case of a call option, A will be the
seller of the option and B the buyer, while in the case of a
put, these roles will be reversed. At all times, the risk-free
rate of return is 10%. Neither A nor B is a trader or dealer
in stock or options.
Throughout this discussion, the terms ATM, ITM and OTM are
defined relative to the forward price of the underlier on the exercise
61. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-4.
62. See § 1092.
63. See § 1091.
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date, as determined on the option sale date. This usage differs from
standard usage, which defines the terms relative to the value of the
underlier on the date the determination (as ATM, ITM or OTM) is
made. Further, interest is assumed to accrue on a continuously compounded basis rather than periodically. For example, under an assumed rate of 10% compounded continuously, property worth $100 on
Day 1 would have a forward price of $110.52 on Day 2, one year later.64 The assumption of continuous compounding is made to simplify
the analysis because the Black-Scholes model of option pricing on
which the analysis rests assumes continuous compounding. The
analysis here would hold if Black-Scholes were modified to assume
periodic compounding, but it is easier to hold Black-Scholes constant
and to assume continuous compounding rather than to hold constant
the assumption that interest compounds periodically and modify
Black-Scholes. Under these parameters, a call option sold on the
property on Day 1 having an exercise date of Day 2 would be ATM if
the strike price is $110.52, OTM if it is above $110.52, and ITM if it
is less than $110.52. For a put option, the ITM and OTM designations would be reversed.
1.

Basic Call Option

Consider first an ATM call option that A sells to B. Since the riskfree rate is 10%, an ATM option will have a strike price of $110.52. It
would sell for $11.92.65 Under the open transaction doctrine, A does
not take the $11.92 into income on Day 1 but instead waits until
something further happens. In the meantime, A can invest the premium. While investment earnings would be subject to tax, the exemption of the principal from tax is equivalent to taxing the premium
but exempting the yield on it.66 In other words, it is equivalent to
consumption taxation of the premium.67 The nondeductibility of the
premium to B may provide some comfort from a tax revenue perspective, but the fact remains that on an individual basis, the parties are
not properly taxed.68 And if the parties are not subject to the same
marginal rates, revenue neutrality also is not preserved. This last

64. The general formula for continuous compounding is: A = Pert, where A is the
amount, P is the initial principal, r is the rate expressed as a decimal, and t is the number
of years.
65. The pricing is based on the Black-Scholes theorem and can be derived using a
Black-Scholes pricing calculator, many of which are available online. See, e.g., The Derivatives ‘Zine, http://www.margrabe.com/OptionPricing.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
66. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME,
EMPLOYMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 301 (1948).
67. Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption
Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006).
68. One can view the overall arrangement as a kind of surrogate taxation.
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problem may be particularly acute where B is a non-U.S. person not
subject to U.S. tax generally.
The fact that A acquires an investment opportunity suggests that
there is an exchange in the transaction because parties dealing at
arm’s length do not exchange value for nothing. The fact that no
payment occurs on the option sale date suggests further that the
transaction contains a loan of some sort. In short, if parties dealing
at arm’s length do not provide something for nothing, the investment
opportunity that A acquires will have been paid for.69 Therefore, the
absence of explicit interest indicates that the price of the option is
discounted.70 B pays an amount for the option that reflects the forgone opportunity to earn a return on the premium during the year
prior to exercise. Stated otherwise, $11.92 represents the discounted
present value of the option premium on Day 2. Under the assumed
10% risk-free rate of return, if the option premium were due on that
day (regardless of exercise), B would pay $13.17. This analysis suggests that interest should be deemed to accrue on the premium for
tax purposes, with a corresponding deduction to A.
The failure to tax the interest on the premium is not the only
troubling feature of the option sale.71 Considering the possible outcomes of the transaction, it seems clear that on Day 1, A has locked
in gain no matter what happens. On that day, A receives $11.92. If
the option is exercised, A will receive an additional $110.52 on Day 2,
for a total of $122.44, in exchange for the stock. A’s taxable gain will
be $112.44. If the option is not exercised, A gets to keep the $11.92,
again fully taxable, without parting with the stock. It is therefore unclear why A should not be taxed in some fashion on the $11.92 on receipt (with, under current law, a corresponding basis adjustment).
The justification for open transaction treatment would not seem to
apply in this instance, since it is known on Day 1 that there will be
income and that under current law it is capital in nature. Although,
under current law, it is not known on Day 1 whether the gain will be
short-term or long-term,72 the justification for short-term gain to option writers in the nonexercise case is not that such gain is “inherently” short-term, but that grantors will manipulate the timing of
capital gains if the character of the gain depends on the holding pe-

69. William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor With No Clothes: The Supreme Court's
Tax Rules for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1685, 1695 (1994) (“From
an economic perspective there are no interest-free loans, only hidden, or imputed, interest.
The hidden interest . . . is always there.”).
70. See id.
71. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 4-8 (criticizing the failure to tax interest on the premium).
72. If the option lapses, the premium is considered short-term capital gain under
§1234(b). If the option is exercised, it is considered long-term capital gain under §1234(a),
given the facts of the discussion example.
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riod of the underlier.73 Accordingly, it is unclear why the granting of
an option on appreciated property is not taxable on the grant date to
the extent of at least the lesser of the appreciation or the option premium, with the character of the gain determined by up-front rule,
possibly with adjustment down the road.
2. Basic Put Option
Under the facts of the discussion example, the mirror put option
would have A transferring the $11.92 to B on Day 1 in exchange for
the right, but not the obligation, to sell B the 100 shares of XYZ stock
at $110.52 on Day 2.74 As the grantor of a put, B does not own the
property subject to the option, so the worry that the receipt of the option premium represents partial payment for the underlier would
seem to be misplaced. Again, however, the grantor receives the option
premium with no tax consequences, raising questions about whether
interest should be imputed to the transaction or the grantor should
include the full premium on receipt under a claim of right or prepayment analysis. Claim of right generally requires a taxpayer to include, in income, an amount received that may be subject to a future
return, as long as the taxpayer is not subject to restriction.75 However, if later return is required, the taxpayer typically may take a deduction.76 Similarly, amounts received as prepayments for future services generally are includible,77 subject to limited exceptions.78
The transaction also has sale elements that would seem to point to
possible recognition of gain for A. Although A does not receive cash, A
does obtain protection against downside loss because A can cash out
the stock at any time prior to Day 2 for at least the present discounted
value of $110.52 on Day 2. A thereby has disposed of risk of loss, one of
the primary indicia of ownership.79 Whether that disposition ought to
be sufficient to trigger recognition of gain or loss is less certain. Numerous provisions in the tax law treat the disposition solely of risk of
loss as something short of a sale but different from simple ownership,
73. 26 U.S.C. §1234.
74. As in the case of the call option, the put price is derived using the Black-Scholes
option pricing formula. See supra note 64-65. Where an option is ATM, the put and call
prices are the same on the option sale date.
75. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932).
76. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (providing deduction or credit choice to taxpayer for
certain amounts returned).
77. 26 C.F.R. § 1.451-1(a) (cash-method taxpayers); Schlude v. Comm’r, 372 U.S. 128
(1963) (discussing accrual-method taxpayers).
78. See, e.g., Artnell Co. v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 981 (1968) (holding that deferral for accrual-method taxpayer was allowed where amount and timing of future associated expenses clearly ascertainable at time of receipt); Rev. Proc. 2004-342004-22 IRB 991 (describing one-year deferral for certain prepayments).
79. See Grodt & McKay Realty Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237-38 (1981) (identifying risk of economic loss as a primary aspect of tax ownership).
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typically by tolling applicable holding periods.80 By the same token, no
provision treats a transfer solely of risk of loss as sufficient to trigger
recognition of income.81 Again, however, the idea that nothing of significance for tax purposes has occurred seems questionable.
3. Special Situations
When an option is subject to a special regime, additional problems
arise. These problems are not unique to the option setting but instead
result from the inconsistent tax treatment of parties to the same
transaction. As an example, a dealer in options may purchase a call
from a non-dealer grantor. The dealer does not amortize the premium,
but the option is marked to market annually.82 Consequently, income
or loss is registered by just one side of the transaction while it is open.
Similarly, and as discussed in the Introduction, taxpayers may take
advantage of the different rules that apply to options embedded in notional principal contracts or to options entered into as hedges83 to obtain a timing or character benefit or to arbitrage a return.
III. SUGGESTED CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
This Part develops an economic analysis of options that explains
them in terms of the actual transactions that the parties to an option
sale enter into. For purposes of this basic analysis, it is assumed that
either the put purchaser or the call writer owns the underlier—that
is, the analysis here applies to “covered” options. Subpart A states
the theory and Subpart B provides a demonstration. The object is to
provide an account of the economic consequences of option sales that
illuminates the basic tax issues they raise. These issues are explored
in Part IV.
The approach developed here relies on the Black-Scholes model for
option pricing, but it does not assume that the model describes what
80. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 246(c)(4) (holding period for purposes of dividend received
deduction is not met during periods in which the taxpayer does not bear the risk of loss of
ownership); 26 U.S.C. § 1058(b)(3) (requiring that the owner of securities in a securities
lending transaction transfer to the borrower neither the risk of loss nor the opportunity for
gain in the securities for the purpose of qualifying for nonrecognition treatment under 26
U.S.C. § 1058(a); 26 U.S.C. § 1059(d)(3) (relying on § 246 rules to toll the holding period for
purposes of satisfying the holding period exception to the application of the extraordinary
dividend basis and gain rules).
81. For example, § 1259, which applies to “constructive sales” of “appreciated financial
positions,” deems a disposition of such a position to occur where, among other things, a
transaction has the effect of disposing of the benefits and burdens of ownership. See 26
U.S.C. § 1259(c) (listing transactions). In Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 649, 655 (1951), the court refused to treat the taxpayer’s nonrecourse borrowing, in
excess of its basis in the property securing the debt, as a disposition of the property.
82. 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(2).
83. 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-4(b) (2010) (requiring taxpayers to match the timing of a hedging transaction with the item hedged in a manner that clearly reflects income).
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the parties to an option transaction actually do. Rather, it treats
Black-Scholes as providing the correct mechanism for the pricing of
financial options, recognizing that Black-Scholes itself is an idealized
model that has great relevance but not direct application to the real
world.84 Black and Scholes demonstrated how to model the purchase
of an option as a combination of borrowing and purchasing or lending
and selling fractional parts of the underlier, with continuous adjustment of the initial loan and equity amounts as the determinants of
the option price varied over time. The equivalence they established
makes possible the accurate valuation of any financial option under
idealized terms, and this valuation in turn is instrumental in explaining the actual transactions that parties to an option engage in.
The equivalence does not imply, however, that the parties to the
transaction should be treated as having engaged in the hypothetical
debt and equity transactions that the model posits.85
A. Statement of the Theory
A covered option is properly viewed as a division of the benefits
and burdens of ownership of the underlier. To the extent the division
is asymmetrical, so that one party assumes risks or acquires benefits
of the underlier not associated with correlative benefits or risks of it,
the option represents a transfer solely of either risk of loss or opportunity for gain in exchange for payment, typically cash.86 This feature
of options has long been well understood. To the extent the division is
symmetrical, so that one party acquires both benefits and correlative
burdens of ownership of the underlier, the option represents an onmarket forward property disposition. This feature of options has not
been well understood. Assuming as a first approximation that there
is no premium associated with the assumption of risk, the value of
the symmetrical transfer equals the value of a riskless instrument
generating the associated interest during the option term.

84. The Black-Scholes model makes a number of idealizing assumptions about options, including that volatility of the underlier can be known and that it is constant. The
model also applies to simple options on nondividend paying securities, though it has been
elaborated in various ways. For a general criticism of Black-Scholes as a model for understanding the pricing of actual options, see Adam H. Rosenzweig, Imperfect Financial Markets and the Hidden Costs of a Modern Income Tax, 62 SMU L. REV. 239, 288 (2009) (describing as an “open secret” the fact that Black-Scholes is wrong in assuming constant volatility of the underlier).
85. In an earlier article, the author suggested rules for the taxation of financial options based on treating the parties as having engaged in the hypothetical transactions that
Black and Scholes posit. David Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation of
Financial instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 439-40. Eric Chason later provided a similar,
though more developed, approach. Chason, supra note 8. The present discussion focuses instead on the transactions in which the parties to an option actually engage.
86. I thank Patrick White for clarification on this point.
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As will be seen, under this theory, the point at which what I call
the true “optionality” of an option—either the purchase of a fluctuating return or the offloading of a fluctuating risk, in either case in exchange for a fixed fee—reaches its maximum is where the asymmetry
between risk-bearing and benefit-reaping is complete. This point occurs for options sold at a strike price that equals the forward price of
the underlier on the strike date, in other words, for options sold (in
present value terms) at the money. Beyond this point—that is, for options issued in the money—there is simply no more possible offloading solely of risk (put option) or purchase solely of potential benefit (call option) with respect to the underlier. Rather, any additional
component of the option sale is simply the forward transfer of a portion of the risk correlative to the potential benefit transferred (call
option) or potential benefit correlative to the risk transferred (put option) by the owner of the underlier that would have remained with
the owner had the option not been ITM. Because this transfer of correlative risk and potential benefit is a transfer of both opportunity for
gain and risk of loss, it is, if not a property transaction, closely akin
to one. Further, because the slice is a symmetrical transfer of potential risk and potential benefit, its value on the option sale date is
simply the value of a debt instrument that would earn the corresponding time value return during the option period (disregarding, for
the moment, the possibility that risk preferences are asymmetrically
distributed among market participants).87
Viewed along a spectrum running from options sold out of the
money, to options sold at the money, to options sold in the money, the
following then can be said to occur on the option sale date:
x In the OTM case, a portion of either the risk of loss (put
option) or the opportunity for benefit (call option) associated
with ownership of the underlier is transferred in exchange
for a cash payment;
x In the ATM case, the entirety of either the risk of loss or
the opportunity for benefit associated with ownership of the
underlier is transferred in return for a cash payment; and
x In the ITM case, a portion of either the risk of loss or the
opportunity for benefit associated with ownership of the underlier is transferred in return for a cash payment, just as in
the OTM case, together with a forward disposition of symmetrical portions of the benefits and burdens of ownership of
the underlier. Because possession of the opportunity for
benefit together with the correlative risk of loss is typically

87.

See infra Part II.B.2.
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paradigmatic of tax ownership,88 this associated transfer can
be considered a forward property transfer.
In short, an ITM option differs from the corresponding OTM option
not by having more “optionality,” but in that the ITM option has an
associated property transfer that actually reduces the optionality as
compared with an ATM option. This analysis explains how options
shade into forward contracts—the greater the extent to which the option is ITM on the option sale date, the more the option sale constitutes a symmetrical transfer of benefits and burdens. At the limit,
where the strike price is zero, all benefits and burdens have been
transferred on the option sale date. An option with a zero strike price
is a forward sale of the underlier.89
Diagram 1 illustrates these ideas. It contains four pictograms. In
each, the horizontal axis represents the fair market value of the underlier on the exercise date, and the vertical axis represents the extent of
risk and benefit retained or disposed of on that date; A and B are the
parties to the option transaction, except in the first pictogram. For
ease of exposition, the risk-free rate at all times is assumed to be zero
and the risk preferences of market participants are disregarded.
The first pictogram represents A’s simple ownership of the underlier. A retains, by definition, all risk of loss and all opportunity for
gain, represented by the arrows going down to zero and up infinitely.
The second pictogram illustrates the effect of A’s sale of a call option to B having a strike price of S1. B has acquired the upside potential in excess of S1, while A has retained upside potential to that point
as well as all the downside risk of underlier. Since S1 exceeds the FMV
on the exercise date, the option is OTM. Note that the option purchaser bears no risk of loss as measured on the option sale date.
The third pictogram represents A’s sale of an ATM call option having a strike price, S2, equal to the underlier’s FMV. Here the optionality—the separation of the opportunity for gain from the risk of
loss—reaches its maximum. B is entitled to all opportunity for benefit and bears no risk of loss, all of which A retains. Under the theory
described above, the option premium paid is at its maximum for this
option, even though ITM options would have higher nominal premiums. Therefore, although an ITM option, as represented in the
fourth pictogram showing an option with a strike price equal to S3,
88. Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221,1243-44 (1981).
89. See David F. Levy, Disparities in Tax Treatment Among Prepaid Forward Contracts, Deep in the Money Options, Prepaid Swaps, and Contingent Debt Instruments, in
TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT
VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS, 432 PLI/Tax 729, 745
n.24 (1998) (“Indeed, as the option premium increases and the strike price of the option decreases, the economic differences between a deep in the money purchase option and a standard prepaid forward contract begin to disappear.”).
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will have a higher nominal option premium than the premium for the
option having the ATM strike price of S2, the higher premium will be
made up for in the stream of future payments under the option. That
is, the timing of payouts under the S3 option hides the fact that the
true swap of fluctuating for nonfluctuating payments is the same as
it is under the S1 option and therefore lower than it is under the S2
option. The optionality pieces of the S1 and S3 transactions—that is,
the portions that represent the transfer of fluctuating benefits for
cash—are the same and are smaller than the optionality piece under
the ATM option (S2).
The fact that the optionality pieces are the same for the depicted
OTM and ITM options does not mean that the two options are the
same. It means only that the way in which they differ has to do with
what else is transferred in the ITM case. In an OTM option, all that
occurs is an exchange of a fixed payment for either the right to a portion of fluctuating upside returns (in a call) or the off-loading of a
portion of fluctuating downside risk (in a put). In the corresponding
ITM option, that same exchange occurs, but there is, in addition, an
on-market forward transfer of a symmetrical portion of the opportunity for gain and the risk of loss of the underlier. This portion is
represented in the fourth pictogram by the dual-pointing arrow that
crosses the FMV line. As contrasted with the swap of benefit (or risk
in the case of a put) for cash that characterizes the optionality piece,
the only net consideration that travels in the other direction is the interest that would be earned on the transfer because the owner of the
underlier transfers a risk that exactly offsets, in expected value, the
benefit that is also transferred. Diagram 2 summarizes these points.
Diagram 1: Simple Ownership and Three Types of Option Transfers
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Diagram 2: Extent of Optionality

The obvious objection to this view is that if the option writer in an
ITM option is considered to be absorbing less risk for cash (in the
case of a put) or parting with less potential benefit for cash (in the
case of a call) than is the writer of an ATM option, and if the related
property transaction under an ITM option is not cashed out until the
exercise date (whether or not exercise occurs), then the price for an
ATM option should exceed the price of both an OTM option and an
ITM option, other things being equal. In fact, of course, the option
price continues to rise as the negotiated terms of the option go farther into the money on the option sale date. For instance, if an OTM
option costs $X on the option sale date, an ATM option having otherwise identical terms will cost more than $X on that date and an ITM
option will cost still more. The price structure of options seems to
suggest that the true optionality increases continuously from deep
OTM, through ATM, to deep ITM.
In fact, the price structure is misleading. The higher price for ITM
options reflects nothing more than a payment scheduling arrangement. The price increase for the option premium attributable to the
option’s having an ITM strike price is precisely made up for in the
payout structure under the option. Viewed as a whole, the portion of
the overall ITM option sale that represents an asymmetrical exchange of risky returns for nonrisky returns, or what I call the true
option piece of an ITM option, is smaller and therefore costs less than
an ATM option by precisely the amount of the associated property
disposition. The pure option piece of an ITM option, that is, the portion of the option premium received in exchange for absorbing risk
(put) or providing opportunity for gain (call), has the same cost as the
identical OTM option.
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These considerations indicate that the property disposition portion
of an ITM option is actually the mirror image of another common
transaction, known as a “collar.” In a collar, the owner of property
disposes of the potential upside benefit above a certain price as well
as the risk of loss below a certain price, retaining opportunity for
gain and risk of loss in-between.90 For example, A may own XYZ
stock having a current fair market value of $100. If A sells a call at
$110 and buys a put at $90, A retains the opportunity for gain and
risk of loss within the $90 to $110 band but has disposed of the remaining opportunity and risk. In the property disposition portion of a
mirror ITM option, the property owner would retain the opportunity
for gain above $110 and the risk of loss below $90 but dispose of the
opportunity and risk in-between. The only difference between this retention and an actual ITM option is that the on-market property disposition in the ITM option is married to an OTM option, so that either the remaining downside risk (in the case of a put) or the remaining upside potential (in the case of a call) accompanies the symmetrical disposition of opportunity and risk. This additional transfer also serves to obscure the forward property disposition that occurs in
the ITM portion of an ITM option.
B. Demonstration
The following illustrations convey these ideas in a series of steps. In
Section 1, the assumed risk-free rate is zero and parties’ risk preferences are disregarded. These assumptions are made to illustrate the
basic nature of option transactions, and they are relaxed in Section 2.
In addition, the discussion does not begin with an option, but with the
type of nonoption property disposition that occurs in an ITM option.
True option arrangements are then added (i.e., exchanges, for cash, of
risk of loss or opportunity for benefit), showing that the resulting
transactions are identical to options observed in the marketplace.
Throughout this Subpart: (1) Owner is the owner of Underlier, a
piece of fungible property worth $100 on the option sale date; and
(2) Purchaser agrees on the option sale date to purchase some or all
of the property from Owner, to engage in related transactions on the
exercise date, or both.
1. Risk Neutrality and Zero Risk-Free Rate
In this Section, the risk-free rate of return is assumed to be 0%
and risk preferences are assumed to be neutrally distributed among

90. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(f)(2)(v) (2010) (prescribing the tax treatment of collars embedded in a notional principal contract).
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market participants, meaning that no one pays a premium to assume
risk or to shed it.
a. Neutral Disposition of Upside Potential and Downside Risk
Consider first a basic forward transfer of the opportunity for gain
and the risk of loss on a portion of Underlier.
Transaction 1: On-market division. On Day 1, Owner
sells Purchaser the first 25% of the upside potential and
Purchaser agrees to assume the first 25% of the downside
risk in the price of Underlier as measured on Day 2, one
year later.
In Transaction 1, the only transfer that occurs on Day 1 is of the
risks and benefits associated with the 25% disposition. Because the
interest rate is zero, Purchaser will pay nothing to Owner on Day 1.
(If on Day 1 Purchaser wished to acquire the 25% interest on Day 2,
Purchaser could also promise on Day 1 to pay, on Day 2, 25% of the
value of Underlier as measured on Day 1. Of course, in the financial
instruments context, either party is indifferent between ownership of
the market value of a property right and the property right itself.)
The parties could effect Transaction 1 by entering into (1) a forward
sale of Underlier on Day 1 for $100 with a settlement date of Day 2,
(2) Purchaser’s sale to Owner of a call on Underlier with a strike
price equal to $100 plus the appreciation up to the first 25% of expected upside benefit as measured on Day 2 and a strike date of Day
2, and (3) Owner’s sale to Purchaser of a put with a strike price equal
to $100 less the decline up to the first 25% of expected downside risk
as measured on Day 2 and a strike date of Day 2. The values of (2)
and (3), by hypothesis, are equal and offsetting. Further, since the
parties are willing to cash-settle Transaction 1, they could do so
simply by agreeing, instead of to transactions (1) through (3), that on
Day 2 Owner would pay Purchaser the actual appreciation, if any, up
to the amount representing the first 25% of the potential upside benefit in Underlier as measured on Day 1. Purchaser would then pay
Owner the actual decline in value, if any, up to the amount
representing the first 25% of the potential downside risk, also as
measured on Day 1.
The range of values that corresponds to the first 25% of the opportunity for benefit and risk of loss in Underlier can be computed using
the familiar Black-Scholes option pricing theorem. This is done by
setting the put and call option premiums equal to 75% of the price of
an ATM option (put or call) as measured on Day 2 and deriving the
associated option strike prices. In dollar terms, this range will be
asymmetrical around the Day 2 forward price (as measured on Day
1), or $100, because on Day 2 Underlier can assume any positive val-
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ue but no negative value.91 Assuming moderate volatility of 10%, the
range is $102.27 to $97.94.92 Thus, Owner will pay Purchaser the
excess, if any, of the value on Day 2 of Underlier over $100, up to
$102.27, and Purchaser will pay Owner the excess, if any, of $100
over the value on Day 2 of Underlier, down to $97.94.
b. Neutral Disposition Plus OTM Put Option
Now suppose that in addition to Transaction 1, Purchaser agrees
on Day 1 to pay the drop in value, if any, of Underlier below $97.94,
as measured on Day 2.
Transaction 2: Division plus put option. The facts are
the same as in Transaction 1, but Purchaser also agrees to
pay the excess, if any, of $97.94 over the FMV of Underlier
on Day 2. Owner transfers $3.00 to Purchaser on Day 1. The
parties agree to cash-settle on Day 2.
Note that Transaction 2 differs from Transaction 1 solely in that it
adds Purchaser’s sale of an OTM put to Owner with a strike price of
$97.94. The put option part of Transaction 2 is the transfer of risk
with respect to possible declines below $97.49. Under the same assumptions about Underlier as apply in Transaction 1, the put value
under the Black-Scholes formula is $3.00.
On Day 2, the following outcomes are possible in Transaction 2:
1. FMV of Underlier equals or exceeds $102.27: Owner
pays Purchaser $2.27.
2. FMV of Underlier is between $100 and $102.27: Owner
pays Purchaser the excess of the FMV over $100.
3. FMV of Underlier is less than $100: Purchaser pays
Owner the difference between $100 and the FMV.93
The critical point to recognize is that the precise economic arrangement that Transaction 2 effects can be replicated under a number of different payment schedules. Owner can pay less or more up
front in exchange for more or less payment on Day 2, as long as interest is appropriately accounted for. (And since, under the simplified
91. The Black-Scholes theorem accounts for this asymmetry through the assumption
that returns are log-normally rather than normally distributed about the forward price.
See HULL, supra note 1, at 277-79.
92. These figures represent the strike prices of a call priced at $3 and a put priced at
$3 when an ATM (whether put or call) is priced at $4. The analysis would not change if the
volatility were different, though the range of prices would change.
93. That is, Purchaser pays up to $2.06 under the piece of Transaction 2 that Transaction 1 represents, and Purchaser pays the excess, if any, of $97.94 over the FMV of Underlier on Day 2, which is Purchaser’s obligation under the put part of Transaction 2. This
sum is the same as what is stated in the text.
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assumptions here, the interest rate is zero, there is no discounting effect from prepayment.) In particular, suppose the parties wanted to
ensure that Owner’s only payment to Purchaser occurs on Day 1.
They could agree to the following:
Transaction 3: Division plus option plus prepayment.
Same as Transaction 2, but Owner pays an additional $2.27
to Purchaser on Day 1, for a total of $5.27, and receives an
additional $2.27 under each payout scenario. The parties
agree to cash-settle on Day 2.
The payouts of Transaction 3 on Day 2 are as follows:
1. FMV of Underlier equals or exceeds $102.27: No payments.
2. FMV of Underlier is less than $102.27: Purchaser pays
Owner difference between $102.27 and FMV.
The net value of Transaction 3 is exactly the same as that of
Transaction 2 because all that has happened is that $2.27 more has
been paid to Purchaser up front and, in each case, the same $2.27 has
been subtracted from Purchaser’s payout or added to Purchaser’s
payment obligation on Day 2. Because the discount rate is assumed
to be 0% in this pattern, the present value on Day 1 of $2.27 on Day 2
is $2.27.
Note, however, that Transaction 3 has exactly the same payout
structure as an ITM put option.
Transaction 4: ITM put option. Owner pays Purchaser
$5.27 on Day 1 in exchange for the right to sell Underlier to
Purchaser on Day 2 for $102.27. The parties cash-settle the
obligation on Day 2.
It is in fact the case that under the same Black-Scholes pricing
model that produced the price of $3.00 for an OTM put with a strike
price of $97.94, the price of a $102.27 put option for Underlier on
these terms is $5.27. In other words, this ITM put is the same as an
OTM put plus the associated property transfer described in Transaction 1. As explained above, this result should not be surprising because it is not possible for the option writer to provide more price
protection with respect to the underlier than is available under an
ATM option.94
94. The statement should be qualified because the parties could enter into an arrangement in which the option writer agrees to overcompensate the option holder for a
drop in price (or, for that matter, to supplement an increase in price). For example, the
parties to a put option could provide that the option writer would pay the option holder 1.5
times the drop in price, if any, prior to exercise. Such a transaction would in effect mimic
the option holder’s purchase of an additional interest in the underlier, together with more
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The preceding discussion suggests the following points:
x An ATM option represents nothing more than the complete separation of the benefits and burdens of ownership of
the underlier between the parties to the option transaction.
x An OTM option is the same as an ATM option, except
that it is a separation of a smaller percentage of the total
benefits and burdens.
x An ITM option is the same as an OTM option plus the onmarket forward sale of a portion of the benefits and correlative burdens of ownership of the underlier. That is, in an
ITM option, some of the exchange of fluctuating returns
(call) or risks (put) for fixed consideration that would otherwise be supplied in an ATM option is replaced by a correlative transfer of the risks (call) or fluctuating returns (put) of
some of the underlier, and the balance is an OTM option
transaction. The transfer of fluctuating returns and correlative risks is a transfer of ownership. On the facts above, the
swap of variable risk for cash in the ITM put option—that is,
the true option piece—is the same as the swap provided under the OTM put having a strike price of $97.94.
o To the extent the ITM option involves the symmetrical transfer of risks and benefits about the FMV expected on the strike date, it is the mirror image of a collar. In a collar, one party retains the risks and benefits
over a range of values straddling the FMV and disposes
of the benefits above that range and the risks below it.
A party creates a collar by writing a call at the abovemarket price and purchasing a put at the below-market
price. In general, the put and call prices are the same if
the percentages of risk and benefit disposed of are the
same.
The ITM portion of an ITM option is the mirror image
of a collar in that the purchaser of the collar retains the
value straddling the FMV on the strike date and disposes of the tails of the distribution, while the call seller
or put purchaser sells the straddling portion and retains the tails.
x The fact that an ITM option costs more than an OTM or
ATM option reflects nothing more than a payment arrangeprice protection. I omit consideration of such arrangements here, as they are not observed
in the market (as far as I am aware). Further, the same basic analysis would apply, though
with more complexity.
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ment between the parties; no additional consideration is exchanged for the ITM portion apart from interest or a risk
premium.
c. Extension to Call Option
A call option differs from a put in that the writer disposes of upside potential instead of assuming downside risk. The net effect,
however, is the same: the option sale effects an asymmetrical distribution of risks and benefits in the underlier so that the writer possesses risks not associated with offsetting benefits. As in the case of a
put, the maximum optionality occurs when the option writer ends up
with all downside risk and the option holder has all the upside potential—namely, an ATM call. When the option is OTM on the option
sale date, there is less potential benefit transferred and, correspondingly, a lower option price. Where the option is ITM on the option
sale date, there is a greater option price than in the ATM case, but
only because a part of the price represents the same type of forward
transfer that arises in the case of a put—that is, a disposition of a
symmetrical portion of the burdens and benefits of the underlier.
The following examples, which use the same assumptions as in
the case of the put, illustrate these points. First, recall Transaction 1:
On-market division. On Day 1, Owner sells Purchaser the first 25%
of the upside potential and Purchaser agrees to assume the first 25%
of the downside potential in Underlier between Day 1 and Day 2, one
year thereafter.
It was shown that the price range corresponding to the first 25%
of the benefits and burdens is $102.27 to $97.94. Thus, if the parties
cash-settle, then on Day 2, Owner pays Purchaser the excess, if any,
of the difference between Underlier’s FMV and $100, up to $2.27. At
the same time, Purchaser pays the excess, if any, of the difference between $100 and Underlier’s FMV, up to $2.06.
Additionally, the parties could effect Transaction 1 with a different schedule of payments. In the case of a call option, Owner writes
the option, so the parties can arrange for a single payment by having
Purchaser rather than Owner prepay.
Transaction 1a: On-market division with prepayment. Same as Transaction 1, except that on Day 1, Purchaser pays Owner $2.06, and on Day 2 Owner will net a
$2.06 payment to Purchaser with whatever other payment is
required on that day to effect the transfer of the first 25% of
upside potential and downside risk.
The only difference between Transactions 1 and 1a is that the parties have rearranged the timing of their payments. In Transaction 1a,
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on Day 2, Owner pays Purchaser the excess, if any, of the difference
between Underlier’s FMV and $97.94, up to $102.27.
Finally, suppose that the parties engage in the following transaction, in addition to Transaction 1a.
Transaction 5: OTM call. On Day 1, Owner separately
sells an OTM call to Purchaser with a strike price of
$102.27, exercisable on Day 2, in one year.
The price of the call is $3.00. Assume again that all transactions
are cash-settled. As in the put option case, the payouts under the
combination of Transaction 1a and Transaction 5 are the same as
under Owner’s simple sale of an ITM call to Purchaser with a strike
price of $97.94. Moreover, Purchaser’s combined payment on Day 1 of
$5.06 is the same as the Black-Scholes price for this ITM call.95
2. Positive Risk-Free Rate
This Section extends the analysis of Section 1 to the more realistic
setting in which the risk-free rate of return is positive. In this context, the transfer of funds gives rise to an interest payment for the
use of money, whether or not the interest payment is expressly broken out. Consequently, in addition to the exchange of risky returns
for a fixed payment and, in the case of an ITM option, the transfer of
beneficial ownership of a portion of the underlier, there also will be
interest paid in the transaction. If the analysis under the zero riskfree rate holds, the same results should follow as before, except that
this interest piece should be present as well.
All assumptions in this Section are the same as in Section 1,
except that the hypothetical risk-free rate is 10% and it is compounded continuously.
a. Neutral Disposition of Upside Potential and Downside Risk
Consider again a basic forward transfer of equal and offsetting
opportunity for gain and risk of loss on Underlier.
Transaction 6: On-market division. On Day 1, Owner
sells Purchaser the first 25% of the upside potential and
Purchaser agrees to assume the first 25% of the downside
risk in the price of Underlier as measured on and Day 2, one
year thereafter.
95. The cost of the option is $5.06, rather than $5.27 in the case of a put, because the
cost of offloading the first 25% of the downside potential is $2.06, while the cost of purchasing the first 25% of upside is $2.27. This difference reflects the fact that in an option, the
minimum value the underlier can take on the exercise date is 0, while there is in principle
no maximum value, and in the call case the payment goes in the other direction. See generally HULL, supra note 1, at 277-79.
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At a continuously compounded rate of 10%, the expected value of
Underlier on Day 2 is $110.52,96 and the price of either a call or a put
with that strike price would, as in the case of a zero risk-free rate, be
$4. Analogously, an on-market disposition of the first 25% of potential upside gain and the first 25% of downside risk would correspond
to a range of values for Underlier on Day 2 bounded by the strike
prices for a call and a put each having a cost of $3.00. This range is
$108.24 as the strike price for the put to $113.02 as the strike price
for the call. The only difference between this case and the zero riskfree rate case is that the range over which payments will be made on
Day 2 has shifted up and expanded by the amount of interest expected.97 If on Day 2 Underlier has appreciated, Owner pays Purchaser the lesser of $2.50 (equal to $113.02 less $110.52) or the difference between Underlier’s FMV on Day 2 and $110.52. If on Day 2
Underlier has declined in value, Purchaser pays Owner the lesser of
$2.28 (equal to $110.52 less $108.24) or the difference between
$110.52 and Underlier’s FMV on Day 2.
b. Neutral Disposition Plus OTM Put Option
The same ITM put option that was replicated through the combination of an OTM put and a neutral on-market division when the riskfree rate was assumed to be zero looks as follows under a 10% rate:
Transaction 7: Division plus OTM put option. Same as
Transaction 6, but Purchaser also agrees to pay the excess,
if any, of $108.24 over the FMV of Underlier on Day 2. Owner transfers $3.00 to Purchaser on Day 1. The parties agree
to cash-settle on Day 2.
The payout structure under this combination is as follows:
1. FMV of Underlier equals or exceeds $113.02:
pays Purchaser $2.50.

Owner

2. FMV of Underlier is between $113.02 and $110.52:
Owner pays Purchaser the excess of the FMV over $110.52.
3. FMV of Underlier is less than $110.52: Purchaser pays
Owner the difference between $110.52 and the FMV.98
96. The formula for continuous compounding is FV = PeYr, where FV is future value, e
is the base of the natural logarithm, Y is the number of years to maturity and r is the interest rate expressed as a decimal.
97. Thus, the spread between $97.96 and $102.27 is $4.33. The $4.33 invested at 10%
with continuous compounding for one year is $4.78, which is the difference between
$113.02 and $108.24, the spread on Day 2 in Transaction 6.
98. That is, Purchaser pays up to $2.28 under the piece of Transaction 7 that Transaction 6 represents, and Purchaser pays the excess, if any, of $108.24 over the FMV of Underlier on Day 2, which is Purchaser’s obligation under the OTM put portion of Transaction 7.
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As before, this transaction can be replicated under a payment
schedule that is front-loaded so that Owner pays Purchaser just once,
on Day 1, with no change to the underlying economics. As in the zero
risk-free rate case, this adjustment requires that the maximum
amount Owner may be required to pay on Day 2 under Transaction 7
be incorporated into the payments on Day 1. The difference, however,
is that because the risk-free rate is non-zero, the Day 1 additional
payment must be appropriately discounted. In Transaction 7, Owner’s maximum payout on Day 2 is $2.50. Owner can be guaranteed
not to have to make that payout on Day 2 if on Day 1 Owner pays, in
addition to the $3.00 for the OTM put option, the present value of
$2.50 as measured on Day 2 and, in exchange, receives $2.50 more on
Day 2 than Owner would have received in Transaction 7. The value
on Day 1 of $2.50 as measured on Day 2 is $2.26.99 Therefore, the
parties can replicate Transaction 7 as follows:
Transaction 8: Division plus option plus prepayment.
Same as Transaction 7, but Owner pays an additional $2.26
to Purchaser on Day 1, for a total of $5.26, and receives an
additional $2.50 under each payout scenario. The parties
agree to cash-settle on Day 2.
The payouts of Transaction 8 on Day 2 are as follows:
1. FMV of Underlier equals or exceeds $113.02: No payments.
2. FMV of Underlier is between $110.52 and $113.02: Purchaser pays Owner difference between $113.02 and FMV.
3. FMV of Underlier is less than $110.52: Purchaser pays
Owner $2.50 plus difference between $110.52 and FMV, or
difference between $113.02 and FMV.
This payout structure is the same as that for an ITM put having a
strike price of $113.02, and, again, the Black-Scholes price for this
option is $5.26.
c. Accounting for the Time Value of Money
The discussion above indicates that the analysis when the riskfree rate is positive does not differ from the analysis when the riskfree rate is zero, except that the time value of money plays a role. Its
presence in the ITM option is easiest to see because the price structure of the portion of the ITM option that represents a disposition of
economic ownership (risk and correlative benefit) incorporates a discount rate on the prepayment. Discounting, however, is no less
99. That is, $2.26 invested at 10% continuously compounded yields $2.50 in one year.
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present in the true option piece. If the portion of the option premium
that represents an exchange of fluctuating returns for a fixed payment were unconditionally due on the exercise date rather than payable on the option sale date, the premium would be more expensive
by an amount equal to the accrued interest on the premium between
the date of entry into the option and the exercise date.100
However, the fact that one can impute an interest rate to establish
economic equivalents between payments made on Day 1 and on Day
2 does not settle the question of whether an interest or discounting
element is present in the standard option transaction, where the option premium is paid on Day 1. In particular, it does not demonstrate
that the option purchaser gets the benefit of a discounted price for
the option. That benefit arises only if the option premium is economically prepaid—that is, if the benefit that the option purchaser obtains
is received later than the payment date. If so, then there has been an
extension of the use of money for a period of time, which is to say a
loan, rather than a simultaneous exchange of consideration for goods
or services.101 To illustrate, if on Day 1 A and B agree that A will pay
B today for services to be rendered in one year, interest should be
imputed to A (and deemed paid by B) on the implicit loan that runs
from A to B: the price to A would be higher if A paid for the services
when rendered in one year.102 The difference between the price A actually pays and what the services would cost if paid for when rendered is an interest charge. Analogously, if on Day 1 A and B agree
that B will provide the service to A immediately and A will pay for
them in one year and performance actually occurs in one year, then
the loan runs in the other direction—from B to A.
In the option context, the question is whether the option purchaser receives an immediate or ongoing benefit from the time the option
is entered into, in which case the premium is at most partially discounted and therefore partially a loan, or instead the purchaser receives a benefit only on the exercise date (or dates, for American options). In the latter case, the loan element is clear: the option writer
is paid now for benefits delivered only later. The considerations developed in Part II suggest that all benefits of the option transaction
materialize economically on the exercise date (or dates); therefore,
that interest does economically arise on all parts of the premium
prior to that time. Consider first a simple European option, under
which the option purchaser acquires a right that may be exercised on

100. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money”, 95
YALE L.J. 506, 512-15 (1986).
101. Klein, supra note 69, at 1709-10.
102. See generally Halperin, supra note 100, at 512-15.
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only one exercise date. Although, as one commentator observes,103 the
option purchaser acquires a valuable right on the option purchase
date, that fact merely establishes that future rights have a present
value, not that benefits are conferred when the future right is acquired. The purchaser of a remainder interest in property also acquires valuable rights on purchase, but it does not appear that the
rights are used prior to the ripening of the interest. The question,
therefore, is not whether the option purchaser acquires a valuable
right on the option purchase date. Rather, it is whether any of the
rights so acquired are immediately cashed out, and it seems clear
that they are not. If they were, one would expect a systematic decline
in the value of rights during the period between the option purchase
date and the exercise date. No such decline takes place. Indeed, one
does not imagine that if, after the option sale, the option writer signaled that it would default on the exercise date, the option holder’s
damages would be discounted by the portion of the pre-exercise period that had elapsed. Further, on the writer side, nothing is required
until the exercise date. Prior to that time, the writer merely stands
ready to perform.
The question is more difficult for an American option. The analysis runs the same for the period prior to the first exercise date, but it
is less clear how to analyze the period during which exercise is possible. In purely legal terms, during the exercise period, the option writer has an ongoing obligation to do something until the earlier of exercise or lapse, suggesting that benefits may be provided continuously
during the exercise period. Even so, the fact of an on-going obligation
does not seem to give rise to the transfer of an on-going benefit or
service. Unlike a person who contracts to provide services as needed
over a fixed period of time, the obligation under an option contract is
singular. The option writer has only one obligation; prior to fulfilling
it, the writer need do nothing, just as during the pre-exercise period.
Conversely, once exercise occurs, the duty is fully discharged. The only difference between the writer’s obligations before the exercise period and during the period prior to exercise is that the writer may be
more constrained in its use of resources because it must have the resources on hand at all times from the first exercise date until exercise
or lapse. This heightened obligation appears to be relatively trivial.
Further, the case for treating the service as provided on exercise is
even stronger in economic, as opposed to legal, terms. As a matter of
economic theory, any call option should be exercised on the last day
of the exercise period because of the benefit in ex ante terms that the

103. Kevin J. Liss, Options as Disguised Financings: The Demise of an Urban Tax Legend, 27 VA. TAX REV. 907, 927-30 (2008).
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passage of time has on its value.104 Under the reasonable assumption
that holders of financial options act solely on the basis of the economic dictates of their positions, an American call option should be
viewed as equivalent to a European call option whose strike date is
the last day of the American option’s strike period. This general rule
must be qualified for put options because the value of the right to invest the proceeds of sale on exercise of the put may exceed the value
of the potential fluctuations in the underlier price, depending on the
extent to which the put is ITM during the exercise period, the volatility of the underlier, and the risk-free rate.105 Nonetheless, the fact
that all of the value of the put, like that of a call, is realized on exercise suggests again that all benefits, if any, are realized on exercise.
3. Risk Premium
The discussion to this point has disregarded the market in risk;
instead, it has proceeded on the assumption that market participants
are as apt to take on risk as to lay it off, with the consequence that no
party to the option transaction receives a fee to engage in the transaction. In practice, however, risk-bearing is costly because of the
marginal utility of wealth, which means there is a systematic bias
against risk assumption.106 Individuals with low wealth will suffer a
greater subjective cost from the loss of a dollar than they will enjoy a
benefit from the gain of a dollar, while individuals with greater
wealth are less subject to these costs. Thus, wealthier individuals
tend to assume more risk than poorer ones. For example, individuals
increase the proportion of fixed to variable returns in their portfolios
as they age because107 time is an inchoate form of wealth that investors transform into material wealth by investing in riskier returns
earlier in their lives. Earlier generations pay later ones to do this.
Similarly, more skilled individuals such as dealers or traders bear
risk as a service to others and receive compensation for doing so. The
compensation is typically observed in such items as the spreads that
dealers charge, insurance fees, and the systematic difference between
fixed and floating rates of interest observed in swap transactions.108
The phenomenon of fixed-for-floating-exchange that lies at the
core of any option transaction might suggest that put writers and call
purchasers systematically charge a premium to take on downside
risk or to cash out upside benefit in any option arrangement. The in104. HULL, supra note 1, at 211-12.
105. Id. at 212-14.
106. See generally Sergio Pastorello et al., Statistical Inference for Random-Variance
Option Pricing, 18 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 358 (2000).
107. Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos & Alexandra Bernasek, Financial Risk Taking by Age
and Birth Cohort, 72 S. ECON. J. 981, 983 (2006).
108. See generally id.
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tuition is clear in the case of put writers, who enable the option purchaser to cash out all downside risk for a fixed price while retaining
the opportunity to benefit from market appreciation. The extension to
call purchasers, however, does not hold. The reason for this is that
risk premiums are present because of the unpredictability of losses,
not of returns generally whether losses or gains.109 It is the prospect
of a loss, which is more costly for persons of relatively lower wealth,
that generates a risk premium. Bearing in mind that the owner of
any underlier can eliminate all risk simply by selling the underlier
and investing in a riskless instrument, the owner of the underlier
will not sell a call to lock in a fixed upside while continuing to bear
downside risk unless the owner is paid a fee. That fee is a risk premium. Thus, in general, option holders pay option writers a risk
premium. This premium should be observable as a higher option
premium for both puts and calls, to the extent in either case the
holder acquires a floating benefit or disposes of a floating loss.
This analysis suggests a testable hypothesis. The theory developed
in this paper is that all options contain an asymmetric exchange of a
fixed payment either to receive a variable benefit (call option), or to
shed an unknown risk (put option), and that ITM options contain a
shift of a portion of the symmetric benefits and burdens of ownership
of the underlier. The discussion of risk in this Section indicates that
to the extent options are asymmetric exchanges of fluctuating for
known returns (that is, not ITM), the writer of the option will charge
a fee. However, to the extent an option is ITM, a portion of the benefits and burdens of ownership of the underlier are shifted to the party
that would own the underlier (or an equivalent cash value) should
the option be exercised. Therefore, in the case of an ITM call, one
would expect the risk premium a call writer receives respecting the
non-ITM portion of the option to be offset by the risk premium the
option holder receives respecting the ITM portion, since the ITM portion involves an assumption of both opportunity and risk. In other
words, observed risk premiums for calls should reach a maximum
when the strike price is ATM on the option sale date and then decline
rapidly for strike prices on the option sale date that are deeper ITM.
Indeed, the net risk premium should shift in the direction of the call
purchaser once the purchaser is bearing more than half the risk of
ownership of the underlier–in other words, well before the strike
price reaches zero, which is simply a prepaid forward contract.
A similar though less dramatic phenomenon should be observable
in the case of a put option. The risk premium reaches its maximum
when the option is sold ATM. For put options sold ITM, no additional
risk premium is collected. Consequently, the portion of the option
109. Id.
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premium attributable to the ITM portion should not reflect any additional charge to assume risk.
C. Conclusion
Any covered option represents a separation of at least some of the
risks of ownership of the underlier from some of the benefits of ownership. The extent of separation reaches a maximum when the strike
price of the option is equal to the forward price of the underlier on
the exercise date—that is, when it is ATM as measured on the exercise date. For options sold out of the money on the option purchase
date, less separation occurs. For options sold in the money on the option purchase date, less separation also occurs than in an ATM option, but there is an additional forward property disposition. The
payment arrangement obscures the forward property disposition because the arrangement makes the ITM portion of the option premium
appear as consideration for additional “optionality,” when in fact the
arrangement is merely a timing mechanism.
Once the forward element of an ITM option becomes manifest, it
becomes clear that the most apt analogy of an option to an existing
instrument is to a partnership. Partnerships commonly exhibit the
kind of sequential ownership involved in an ITM option. Indeed,
Bruce Kayle has noted the substantial affinity between a call option
and certain partnership arrangements, though he does not develop
the point.110 Rather, he illustrates the idea through a simple comparison. He notes that the owner of income-producing property
(Partner 1) can contribute it to a newly formed partnership in exchange for cash and a partnership interest that entitles the partner
to X% of the income from the property over time and to Y% of the appreciation of the property, if any, after five years, at which time the
partnership will sell the property. Another person (Partner 2) would
then contribute cash to the partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest that entitles the partner to the remaining 100%-X% of the
income and to 100%-Y% of the appreciation on sale.111 Kayle observes
that the partnership arrangement just described is not very different
from Partner 1’s sale to Partner 2 of an income interest and a separate option to purchase a portion of the property in five years.112
Kayle’s point is that the sequential nature of ownership characteristic of certain option transactions is just the sort of sharing arrangement commonly found in partnerships. That point is corroborated by
the analysis above, which demonstrates that ITM options involve a
110. Kayle, supra note 11, at 270-75 (Example 10).
111. Id.
112. The cash flows are different in the option and partnership cases, but their present
values should be the same.
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kind of sequential sharing of ownership of the underlier. One party
bears the first X% of risk and benefit, and the other party the remainder, though there is additionally an OTM option that then separates risk from benefit.
Finally, the discussion in this Part explains the essential similarity between the forward sale portion of an ITM option and a collar.
The only difference is in the identities of the persons holding the various interests in the underlier. In a collar, the original owner parts
with risks and benefits at a remove from the forward price and retains the risks and benefits immediately surrounding the forward
price, while in the forward sale portion of an ITM option the opposite
occurs: the original owner parts with the risks and benefits immediately surrounding the forward price and retains the risks and benefits at a remove. As a consequence, the parties end up in the opposite
posture, but the nature of the division of ownership is identical. This
identity is obscured not only by the payment arrangement in an ITM
option but by the fact that the ITM property disposition is married to
a genuine option purchase in which one of the tails is also sold—
through either an offloading of downside risk or the purchase of floating benefit, in either case in exchange for a fixed payment.
IV. TAX ANALYSIS
This Part evaluates the tax rules that ought to apply to options in
light of the analysis in Part III. Because of the realization rule and
the special treatment that the tax law affords to capital assets,113 two
basic cases arise: where the party selling upside potential (call writer) or purchasing downside protection (put purchaser) owns the underlier (a covered option), and where the underlier serves merely as a
reference obligation for the option writer and holder. The first case
divides into two subcases: where the underlier is held by the relevant
party at all times between the option sale date and the exercise date,
and where it is not, which is akin to a short sale. Subpart A deals
with the cases involving ownership of the underlier, and Subpart B
deals with those in which the underlier serves as a reference obligation. Finally, Subpart C explores some of the approaches that might
be adopted under current law, or with some variation to current law,
in light of the tax analysis that would apply under basic tax principles as developed in Subparts A and B.

113. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006) (discussing preferential rates for certain longterm capital gains); 26 U.S.C. § 1211 (discussing limitations on capital loss deductions); 26
U.S.C. § 1212 (discussing carryover of excess capital losses).
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A. Underlier Owned
In this Subpart, assume that the put purchaser or the call seller
owns the underlier on the exercise date. In Section 1, ownership
commences no later than the option sale date, while in Section 2, the
consequences of the holder’s acquisition of the underlier after the option sale but prior to the exercise date are briefly considered.
Throughout, basic income tax principles are applied without regard
to either special statutory and regulatory rules that provide for contrary treatment or questions of tax administration. Thus, dispositions of equity are taxable as realization events;114 services income is
taxed on receipt,115 subject to certain limited exceptions;116 and time
value of money income accrues on a constant yield-to-maturity basis
with continuous compounding.117
The principal tax question raised for any covered option is whether the option sale is in whole or part a capital transaction, and that
question depends in turn on whether and to what extent the transaction is a property transaction.118 In the financial instruments context,
if it is a property transaction, it is likely to be capital,119 unless the
option is stock in trade or inventory of the taxpayer120 or is a hedge
with respect to stock in trade or inventory.121 Capital transactions
generally are treated much differently from noncapital transactions
under the Code. Capital gains and losses are netted,122 capital losses
generally may not be deducted against ordinary income except to a
limited extent,123 and long-term capital gains of individual taxpayers
are taxed at favorable rates.124 Further, income from capital transactions generally is not registered by the tax system until realized.125
By contrast, ordinary income is subject to graduated rates;126 may be
114. 26 U.S.C. § 1001.
115. 26 C.F.R. § 1.451-1 (2010) (discussing cash-method taxpayers); Schlude v. Comm’r,
372 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing the accrual-method).
116. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1367, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
(accrual-method taxpayer permitted to defer, until performance of related services, inclusion of prepaid services income for which the associated future expenses were certain in
time and relatively certain in amount).
117. See note 52, supra, for a discussion of the discrepancies between continuous and
periodic compounding. Tax law generally assumes periodic compounding for interest-like
returns, while the Black-Scholes model applies continuous compounding.
118. § 1221(a) defines a capital asset as all property other than certain property excluded from the definition. 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a).
119. 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2006).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 1221.
122. 26 U.S.C. § 1222.
123. 26 U.S.C. § 1211 (limitation on capital loss deductions); 26 U.S.C. § 1212 (carryover of excess capital losses).
124. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h).
125. 26 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
126. 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)-(d).
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subject to an accrual or other regime that accounts for income on an
on-going basis, regardless of when it is realized;127 and may, in the
case of losses, offset capital and ordinary income.128
Yet, although the concepts of “capital income” and “ordinary income” are deeply rooted in the income tax, most commentators agree
that there is no pure concept of either that permits a ready or cogent
argument for characterizing any particular item as intrinsically one
or the other.129 Modern finance theory has long recognized that any
“ordinary” payment stream can be discounted into a present fixed
“capital” sum. Given the economic equivalence between the two, efforts to identify a principled basis for determining which side of the
line a transaction should fall on when the transaction shares some
characteristics of both seems largely pointless.130 Rather, a better approach is probably functional: Which characterization best serves the
goals of the income tax? In light of the favorable treatment of capital
income and the general preference to limit that treatment rather
than to make it widely available, the better approach inclines toward
ordinary characterization in ambiguous cases, unless a reason for a
different result is manifest. Accordingly, in this discussion, capital
treatment is reserved for gain or loss realized from the disposition of
property, where property ownership is understood in its standard tax
sense of possessing the opportunity for gain and the correlative risk
of loss with respect to some item. Transactions involving the disposition of either just the opportunity for gain or just the risk of loss are
not property transactions but are, instead, “legs” of a property transaction. Sale of an OTM option is one such leg, and if the option is exercised, transfer of the other leg occurs as well, meaning that a property transaction has occurred. If the OTM option is not exercised,
then the initial leg is undone and no property disposition occurs.
Consequently, capital treatment for the disposition that occurs on the
option sale date of an OTM option (or more accurately to the extent
the option is OTM) seems inapposite.
In an ITM option, by contrast, there is, in addition to an OTM option a property disposition of a portion of the underlier. This occurs
because the transfer of benefits and correlative burdens in the ITM
portion of the option is paradigmatic of a property disposition. Therefore, a tax system that reaches the “right” answer in the sense that it

127. See 26 U.S.C. § 475 (mark-to-market of dealer inventory); 26 U.S.C. § 1272 (current accrual of OID); 26 C.F.R. § 1.1275-4 (2010) (current accrual of OID on contingent
payment debt instruments).
128. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 62-63 (2006).
129. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax
Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999).
130. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Seventeen Culls from Capital Gains, 48 TAX NOTES
623 (1990).
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reserves capital treatment for disposition of all and only capital assets in any option transaction would tax the ITM portion, if any, as a
capital transaction, assuming the underlier was a capital asset in the
relevant party’s hands.
1. Ownership Throughout the Option Term
Under the analysis in Part III, every option involves an asymmetric division of ownership of the benefits and burdens of the underlier
to the extent it is non-ITM. This asymmetric division seems to bear
some attributes of a property transfer and some attributes of a nonproperty transfer. Separately, ITM options involve a symmetrical
transfer of benefits and burdens that more closely resembles a forward property disposition. The following Subsections address these
aspects of option transactions.
a. Non-ITM Option
Part III established that a non-ITM option in effect divides ownership of the underlier between the option holder and the option writer.
The transaction is not capital in the traditional sense because it is
not a transfer of property, but a peculiar sort of sharing arrangement
in which the option holder retains or acquires certain benefits but not
detriments, while the writer acquires or retains certain detriments
but not benefits. Together, the two parties have all the indicia of
ownership but separately neither does for any range of values covered by the option. The full consequences of a disposition of the underlier to a third party would be borne just as they are borne by an
owner, but these consequences would be divided unequally between
the writer and the holder.
Viewed from this perspective, the non-ITM option premium is a
fee that the holder pays for the writer to accept the adverse consequences of ownership. It is a prepayment for the service of bearing
the risk of property ownership without the associated benefit on the
exercise date. In general, prepayments not for a capital asset are subject to immediate taxation, unless an exception applies.131 Apart from
narrow statutory exceptions for certain types of subscription income132 and club dues,133 the only exceptions to immediate inclusion
of prepaid services income are for an accrual-method taxpayer that
either satisfies the requirements for administratively granted safe
harbor relief (not here applicable)134 or can reliably associate the pre131. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.451-1 (cash-method taxpayers); Schlude v. Comm’r, 372 U.S. 128
(1963); Am. Auto Ass’n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961) (accrual-method taxpayers).
132. 26 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
133. 26 U.S.C. § 456.
134. Rev. Proc. 04-34, 2004-22 I.R.B. 991.
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paid item with an obligation to be discharged for a relatively certain
amount in a readily identifiable subsequent tax period.135 Because of
the contingency of the obligation that an option writer assumes, the
latter exception does not apply either, leading to immediate inclusion. Although a better theoretical result would be to defer inclusion
(and any associated deduction) until the period of exercise or lapse
and to treat the option premium as a loan, requiring immediate inclusion instead without any deemed interest or expense on the loan
may not be a bad proxy for taxation of the holder’s interest and the
writer’s associated deduction on a deemed loan.136
The holder should enjoy mirror treatment. Assuming the option is
entered into in connection with the taxpayer’s trade or business or
other income-producing activity, the premium should be deductible
as, respectively, a business expense137 or an expense incurred in connection with the production of income.138 The deduction should be allowed in the period in which the exercise date (or, for the reasons
stated previously, the last date of the exercise period) occurs.139
If the non-ITM option is exercised, the second “leg” of the property
disposition occurs, and at this point it is appropriate to treat the total
transaction (option sale plus exercise) as a property disposition. This
treatment is correct because the original owner of the property has
now parted with the benefits and the associated burdens of ownership.
Consider the simple OTM put option described as part of Transaction
2, under which Owner paid Purchaser $3.00 on Day 1 for the right to
put Underlier to Purchaser on Day 2 for $97.94.140 Suppose Owner exercises; i.e., Underlier is not worth more than $97.94 on Day 2. Solely
with respect to the OTM portion of Transaction 2 (and assuming here
that the associated ITM portion of the option had not been entered into), on Day 1, Owner transferred the risk of loss below $97.94 to Purchaser. Owner retained the risk of loss down to $97.94 as well as the
potential for upside gain. On Day 2, Owner bears the loss from $100 to
$97.94 and transfers all potential for upside gain to Purchaser. Although the property transfer appears to be off-market (in that the
135. See, e.g., Artnell Co. v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968); Rev. Proc. 2004-34.
136. See David Hasen, The Tax Treatment of Advance Receipts, 61 TAX L. REV. 395
(2008).
137. 26 U.S.C. § 162.
138. 26 U.S.C. § 212.
139. If the deduction is under § 212, it may be subject to the 2% floor applicable to certain taxpayers’ itemized deductions. See 26 U.S.C. § 67. Prior to the 2003 adoption of regulations under § 263, a cash-method taxpayer arguably was able to deduct the premium in
the period paid, even if the exercise date occured in a subsequent period. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.461-1(a)(1) (providing that cash-method taxpayers deduct expenses in the year paid unless a long-lived asset is created). Under current regulations, however, most premiums
paid for options exercisable in a subsequent year must be capitalized. 26 C.F.R. § 1.263(a)4(c)(1)(iii)(E) .
140. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.263(a)-4(c)(1)(iii)(B) (2004).
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property appears to change hands on Day 2 at a price that differs from
its FMV on that day), this is merely an appearance. The transfer of
possession is a formality. The actual transfer of benefits and burdens
took place in two steps—on Day 1 when some of the risk of loss shifted,
and on Day 2 when the opportunity for gain went over as well. The two
transfers, together, are on-market.
If the option lapses, the originally transferred leg is transferred
back and no property disposition occurs. For instance, if Underlier in
the example above is worth any amount greater than $97.94 on Day
2, the loss below $97.94 on Day 2 is zero.
b. ITM Option
For an ITM option, the analysis is more complicated. On the option sale date there is, in addition to a separation of some of the benefits of ownership of the underlier from some of the associated burdens, an on-market forward disposition of a portion of the underlier.
This portion of the option sale, therefore, should be treated as a forward of a certain sort. Perhaps unfortunately, under current law,
forwards are generally held open,141 subject to certain exceptions,142
until the actual transfer of the property takes place. Open transaction treatment for forwards when the seller owns the underlier seems
even less justifiable than open transaction treatment for options. In a
forward, all the seller retains is a wasting present interest—the value of which is known on the sale date. With respect to the portion
sold, full transfer of benefits and burdens has occurred. Consequently, and as a number of commentators have observed,143 a current sale of future rights should be accounted for currently even under our realization-based income tax. If forwards were currently
taxed, then the ITM portion of an ITM option should be treated as a
taxable transaction when the option is sold.
Naturally, the introduction of separate treatment for the property
disposition portion of an ITM option introduces complexity into the
tax rules for options. Moreover, the complexity is compounded by the
fact that the property disposition in an ITM option is of a peculiar
sort. It is not the disposition of a physical portion, a ratable portion,
or a temporal portion of the underlier, but rather of a risk portion.
For each of the first three types of division, the tax rules are relatively straightforward, at least in conceptual terms. If, for example, the
141. 26 U.S.C. § 1233.
142. 26 U.S.C. § 1256 (certain regulated futures contracts subject to mark-to-market
taxation); 26 U.S.C. § 1259 (constructive sale of appreciated financial positions).
143. See, e.g., Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 8; Hasen, supra note 13; Levy, supra note
89. In addition, certain provisions of the Code already require present accounting for forward
dispositions. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 305(e) (present accounting of certain preferred dividendstripping transactions); 26 U.S.C. § 1286 (present accounting of bond-stripping transactions).
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owner of a share of stock sells a fraction of the share, the extent of
the risk and benefit in the underlier that the purchaser acquires is
proportional to the fraction purchased. Thus, the purchaser of onehalf the share would assume a risk of loss equal to 50% of the risk
associated with the full underlier and acquire the correlative potential benefit.144 The same result applies to cotenants that share an undivided interest in real property.145 Similarly, a temporal division of
the underlier results, in conceptual terms, in the creation of a wasting present interest and a growing future interest. The tax rules for
such property dispositions can be complicated, but the underlying
conceptual analysis is well understood.146
By contrast, in an ITM option, the transfer of partial ownership in
the underlier is sequential, or “horizontal.” The parties do not share
risk and reward ratably or in temporal succession but rather in
risk/benefit sequence. If the ITM portion of the option represents a
forward sale of X% of the underlier, then the transferee assumes the
first X% of risk and reward, while the transferor retains the remaining (100 – X)%, which is distributed about the transferred portion.
This division suggests that the transferor should be viewed as disposing of property “off the top,” in that the portion disposed of is the portion that is first and exclusively affected by price fluctuations in the
underlier. Once the division occurs, post-option sale fluctuations in
the value of the underlier that do not exceed the range of risk and
benefit transferred have no economic effect on the transferor. This
means that the transferor has no economic stake in those fluctuations. At the same time, price fluctuations that do exceed the range
have no (additional) effect on the transferee, meaning that the transferee has no stake in them.
These considerations indicate that the transferor’s tax basis in the
portion of the underlier sold forward should be allocated only to the extent that it falls within the actual price range of that portion on the option sale date. If the transferor’s basis does not fall within that range,
the transferor has no tax cost associated with the disposition at all,
and therefore no basis should be allocated to offset the proceeds. This
approach tends to result in a more certain but smaller recognition of
gain or loss on disposition than would a ratable allocation rule.
Transaction 4, discussed previously, illustrates the basic analysis:
Transaction 4: ITM put option. Owner pays Purchaser
$5.27 on Day 1 in exchange for the right to sell Underlier to
144. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.616 (2009) (providing basis rules for partial dispositions of property).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Joyce & Louis A. Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAX
L. REV. 121 (1976).
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Purchaser on Day 2 for $102.27. The parties cash-settle the
obligation on Day 2.
Transaction 4 consists of an OTM put having a strike price of $97.94
and a prepaid, on-market disposition of the first 25% of opportunity
for gain and risk of loss of Underlier, corresponding to the range of
values on Day 2 between $97.94 and $102.27. In the transaction, the
risk-free rate was assumed to be zero, no risk premium was paid, and
Underlier’s FMV on Day 1 was $100.
If we suppose that Owner’s basis is anything less than $97.94,
then under the theory that basis should be allocated to the disposition only to the extent Owner has basis over the disposed of range,
Owner should be treated as recognizing $100 - $97.94, or $2.06, of
gain. Thus, if Owner’s basis is $80, Owner has $2.06 of gain. By contrast, if Owner’s basis is $98, Owner has $2 of gain.
One might object that if Owner has basis in excess of 75% of the
Underlier’s FMV, Owner should get a partial basis offset on the option sale date because only 25% of Underlier is sold. Thus, if Owner’s
basis is $80, it might seem Owner should recognize four-fifths
($80/$100) of $2.06, rather than the full $2.06. However, because the
sale is not of a ratable portion but of an identifiable horizontal slice,
and because the risk and benefit disposed of is associated only with
that slice, a ratable basis allocation rule would seem to be incorrect;
it does not associate “paid-for” basis with a “paid-for” portion of the
underlier sold. Note further that although less basis offset occurs
than in a ratable disposition, the amount of gain recognized on the
option sale date is smaller. Although Owner has disposed of 25% of
the opportunity for gain and risk of loss and Owner allocates no basis
to the portion sold, Owner’s gain is $2.06 rather than 25% of the entire $25 of built-in gain, or $6.25.
Analogous treatment occurs where Owner is in a loss position.
Owner may take a loss equal to the lesser of $102.27 - $100 or Owner’s basis in Underlier - $100. This treatment reflects the fact that,
solely with respect to the ITM portion of the option, Owner has disposed of tax ownership through that range but not above or below it.
If the option is exercised, the retained portion of Underlier is simply
transferred pursuant to the exercise, as described above in the OTM
case. If the option is not exercised, the sold portion is deemed repurchased at its FMV and Owner’s basis in that portion simply reflects
the part of the option premium paid on Day 1 that is allocable to it.
2. Ownership Acquired After Option Sale
Under the analysis developed in Part III, only ITM options involve
a property transfer prior to the exercise date. All options, however,
involve a risk-benefit disaggregation transaction on the option sale
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date, together with a reunification on the exercise date of the parts
previously separated. If the option is exercised, the “trailing” leg that
the initial owner (the put seller or call writer) retained goes over to
the property purchaser, while if the option is not exercised, the “leading” leg that the initial owner transferred is returned to that owner.
Since the non-ITM portion does not involve a property disposition,
the ownership of the underlier prior to the exercise date is irrelevant.
Gain or loss on exercise of the option will continue to be determined
by the difference between exercise price and basis of the underlier
and its basis in the owner’s hands, whether that basis was determined after the option sale date (because the underlier was purchased after that date) or not.
A similar approach should apply to the ITM portion, if any, of an
option where the underlier is acquired after the option sale date.
There are two cases in which acquisition of the underlier during the
pendency of the option may have an effect on the tax treatment of the
transaction prior to exercise: where the purchaser of an ITM put and
the seller of an ITM call acquire the underlier. Recall that for both
types of ITM options, on the option sale date the underlier seller
promises to deliver a portion of the underlier (or its equivalent) to the
counter-party on the exercise date. Prior to the seller’s purchase of
the underlier, there should be no tax consequence to the disposition.
Under a realization-based income tax, the tax consequences of entering into the option transaction should first be reckoned on the option
sale date when the forward transfer occurs. On that date, the expected cost of satisfying the transfer is zero: the seller conceptually
exchanges a portion of the underlier for a bond of equal value paying
the risk-free rate. The expected cost to the seller on the option sale
date of satisfying that obligation is just the FMV of the portion of the
underlier sold forward, since that is what the seller would have to
pay on the option sale date to procure the portion sold forward.
Once the seller acquires the underlier, additional tax consequences of the sale may be reckoned. At that time, the seller’s cost of
satisfying its obligation under the forward sale portion of the option
is established. For example, consider the ITM put option in Transaction 4, but assume that Owner does not own Underlier on the option
sale date. If Owner purchases Underlier at $90 six months after the
option sale date, then Owner’s cost of delivering 25% of Underlier on
Day 2 is $0 because the portion of the underlier disposed of in the
ITM piece of the option is entirely in excess of the cost to Owner of
acquiring the property.
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B. Underlier as Reference Obligation
If the parties to the option transaction use the underlier merely as
a reference obligation, the transaction becomes a simple bet. It is a
zero-sum game in which one party’s gain is precisely offset by the
counter-party’s loss.147 In recent years, the tax law has tended to
treat such bets as generating capital income and loss because of the
risky nature of the returns they generate,148 but there appears to be
no deep reason why the returns should not be characterized as ordinary and subject to an economic accrual or similar regime, such as
mark-to-market taxation.149 There is no particular historical
precedent for according capital treatment to returns just because
they are risk-based, and the policy rationales for deferral and favorable rates on capital income do not seem to apply to bets. In general,
these rationales center on encouraging the formation of real capital
and avoiding the bunching of income in a single tax year that arises
under the realization rule. Wagers do not involve the formation of
physical capital, and bunching becomes a problem only where an accrual regime is assumed not to be in place.
If, however, capital treatment of traditional capital assets (such as
where the option involves a physical underlier) is taken as a given,
then the tax rules for wagering-type options should take account of
the avoidance possibilities that dissimilar rules for physical and notional options would create.150 The avoidance possibilities derive from
two main problems: discontinuity and inconsistency. Discontinuity
arises when instruments that generate similar returns are subject to
dissimilar tax rules;151 the general solution is to tax similar instruments like their close substitutes.152 Inconsistency arises when the
same return is taxed differently, depending upon the form in which it
is received;153 the general solution is to adopt a robust method for

147. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 TAXES
783, 784 (1993).
148. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1234A (2006) (treating certain “closing transactions” as generating short-term capital gain and loss); 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(c) (2010) (bullet swap not
treated as subject to NPC rules).
149. See Keinan, supra note 8, at 146 (arguing that all returns from financial instruments should be treated as ordinary and subject to taxation on an accrual or mark-tomarket basis); Hasen, supra note 13, at 403-07 (arguing that a better basis for distinguishing between returns entitled to capital treatment, including deferral under the realization
rule, and ordinary returns accounted for under an economic accrual regime is whether the
taxpayer owns a physical underlier); see also Kleinbard, supra note 147, at 784 (noting that
financial products differ from traditional capital assets in that the former are simple bets
that can be replicated in principle indefinitely).
150. David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999).
151. Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 Stan.
L. Rev. 569, 573 (1994).
152. Weisbach, supra note 150, at 1661.
153. Id. at 1645.

2010]

FINANCIAL OPTIONS IN THE REAL WORLD

835

identifying the overall economic return the taxpayer locks in ex ante,
but the problems with developing such methods are notorious.154 The
problem in the present context is that from the standpoint of either
the writer or the holder of the option, the returns from the bet may
be similar to the returns from a physically settled option. Accordingly, the rules ought to be similar for the two types of transactions.
Further, the rules need to require taxpayers to associate offsetting
positions, such as where the taxpayer buys an option in one form and
sells a similar or identical one in another. How the rules might accomplish these goals falls outside the scope of this discussion; I merely identify the issues here.
C. Possible Tax Approaches
The rules described in the preceding Subparts suffer from
both complexity and the fact that they diverge considerably from current law. The question therefore arises how one might simplify
the rules suggested without either sacrificing the basic ideas or introducing major complexity into current law. The following offers
some general suggestions.
1. Basic Problems Under Current Law
The principal authorities that govern the taxation of options are
Revenue Ruling 78-182155 and, for options on financial assets (other
than those taxed under § 1256, or held as inventory or by dealers), §§
1234 and 1234A. In general, these authorities provide for open transaction treatment on the writing of an option and for capital treatment on sale, exchange, lapse, termination, or exercise of the option
if the underlier is or would be a capital asset in the taxpayer’s hands.
When the option is exercised, in the case of a call the cost of the option is added to the purchaser’s basis and treated as part of the
amount realized by the seller, and the cost of a put is treated as a reduction in the amount realized by the seller and as reducing the purchaser’s basis in the property. There is some question whether any of
these authorities apply to options that by their terms are or may be
cash-settled.
The main differences between these rules and the rules set forth
in Subparts III.A and III.B are as follows:
1. Existing law places most options on open-transaction accounting;

154. Id. at 1663.
155. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265.
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2. Existing law treats all portions of the option premium as
capital (assuming the underlier is a capital asset in the
hands of the relevant party), whereas the preceding discussion suggests that the option premium, to the extent it is for
an OTM option, is ordinary income to the option writer (and
creates an ordinary expense to the option purchaser);
3. No interest income or deduction is imputed to the parties
to an option under present law, whereas economically all
parts of the option premium are discounted to the present
value of the premium payment on the exercise date; and
4. The nonproperty portion of an option transaction is not
separately treated from the property portion.
The first of these differences is the most significant because it
represents a significant deferral opportunity in light of the fact that
many parties to option transactions may be tax-indifferent, or at
least relatively tax-indifferent.156 The simple solution is to treat option premiums as generating ordinary income to the writer and as
providing a deduction to the purchaser in the period in which the
strike date (or the last strike date for American options) occurs. Regarding timing, this change to the law could be accomplished administratively through the revocation of Revenue Ruling 78-182, except
that it is unclear whether the Service would or should revoke 78-182
in light of Congress’s evident intent to affirm open transaction
treatment through adoption of §§ 1234 and 1234A. Further, character changes would need to be addressed through amendment of §§
1234 and 1234A directly.
If one wanted to rectify the problem of mixed ordinary and capital
treatment of the premium, it would be necessary for Congress to remove the statutory obstacles to bifurcation (again, §§ 1234 and
1234A). Having done that, the Treasury likely would have authority
to require bifurcation of the option into capital and noncapital portions on the option sale date and to require separate accounting of
the various pieces of the option payout on the date of exercise, lapse,
or disposition.157 This might or might not prove burdensome, but the
fact that parties dealing in financial options tend to be sophisticated
weighs in favor of a relatively robust accounting regime, possibly

156. See David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda
for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1893-94 (2004).
157. See 26 U.S.C. § 446 (2006) (requiring taxpayer’s method of accounting to “clearly
reflect income”); 26 U.S.C. § 7805 (providing Treasury general authority to prescribe regulations under Title 26).
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augmented by a simplified accounting method that taxpayers could
elect to have apply.158
As regards the problem of failing to account for interest, one could
impute interest income and deduction to the parties on the option
premium. It is not clear that any provision of current law prevents
such an imputation. A somewhat less accurate but administratively
easier approach would be to treat payment of the option premium as
a closed transaction on the option sale date, as indicated above.
Finally, the failure to tax the ITM portion of an option on the option sale date mainly becomes an issue only if forwards become subject to current taxation, as a number of commentators have argued
they should.159 If forwards were taxed on a current basis, it would be
appropriate if not necessary given the similarity of the ITM portion of
ITM options to forwards to alter the rules for options to require identification of the ITM portion, if any, with associated treatment under
the forward contract rules. By the same token, it is unclear how
much would be sacrificed on the option side in preserving open
transaction treatment for both standard forwards and the ITM portion of an option. If the distortion is small, the gain in simplicity may
be worth the cost of incorrect taxation. Of course, that result would
preserve whatever distortions persist as a result of the system’s failure to tax forwards correctly.
A further, less significant, problem resulting from the failure to
tax the ITM portion of an option as a forward on the option sale date
is that the current rules do not treat any portion of the option sale as
taxable if the option is not exercised. The analysis here has demonstrated, however, that economically the owner of the underlier should
be taxed on the forward portion of the ITM option regardless of
whether the option is exercised. Nonexercise should be treated as a
sale back to the option writer, resulting in appropriate basis adjustment, not as though no sale had occurred.
2. Proposals
The discussion above suggests the following rules as a possible regime for taxing financial options.
a. Option Sale Date
x To the extent the option is OTM, the writer includes the
premium in income. The holder takes a deduction under §
162 or 212 for the premium in the period in which or with
158. See, e.g., Prop. 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(e) (proposing a variety of methods to account
for nonperiodic contingent payments made on certain NPCs).
159. See supra Part III.A.
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which ends the last day that the option may be exercised,
subject to any limitations that may apply.160
x To the extent, if any, the option is ITM, the parties treat
the premium as a loan or a prepayment. The reason for differing treatment from the OTM piece is that this portion of
the premium is nothing more than a payment arrangement
for the fluctuation in the part of the underlier sold forward.
Interest is imputed to the option holder at the risk-free rate,
with a corresponding deduction to the option writer. Alternatively, the premium could be included and deducted on receipt, with corresponding adjustments on exercise.
x For an ITM option, the portion of the option that
represents a forward sale is treated as such on the option
sale date, with gain or loss recognized on that date. This
rule presupposes that the rules for forwards are changed to
provide for taxation on the sale date rather than on the date
of delivery.
o As an alternative, the forward may be held open until
the exercise date, in which case the deemed purchase
price must include an interest factor. Further, on lapse,
the portion sold forward is treated as immediately
sold back.
b. Option Exercise
x For non-ITM options, the transaction is a sale at the exercise price, with gain or loss recognized. Character depends on
whether the seller of the property holds it as a capital asset.
o A policy question arises regarding the measuring period for the underlier owner. Where the seller’s holding
period on the option sale date is one year or less and on
the exercise date is more than one year, it is unclear
whether gain or loss on exercise should be short-term or
long-term.161 As explained above, the sale in effect occurs in two stages. Administrability considerations suggest that a bifurcation regime should not apply, while
the general policy of limiting the preferential treatment
of capital transactions suggests that the gain or loss
should be short-term. On the other hand, there may be
160. See, e.g., §§ 68 (phase-out of itemized deductions), 161 (denying double deduction
for any item), 261 (disallowance of deductions for expenditures that must be capitalized).
161. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006) (providing for preferential treatment of long-term capital gains for individuals); 26 U.S.C. § 1222 (defining long-term capital gains as gains on
capital assets held more than one year); 26 U.S.C. § 1223 (defining holding period).
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greater deadweight loss from denying long-term capital
treatment in this setting than from permitting it. The
correct answer is not clear.
x For ITM options, exercise represents a sale of the balance
of the underlier, but taking account of basis already assigned to the portion sold forward on the option sale date.
c. Option Lapse or Cancellation
x On a non-ITM option, there are no consequences on lapse
other than deduction for the premium, if it has not already
been deducted.
x On an ITM option, the property previously treated as sold
forward is treated as sold back; if it was held open on the option sale date, a sale and sale-back occur.
V. CONCLUSION
Options represent nothing more than a particular type of property
division. They are not spatial, as when a party sells a physical piece
of a larger asset, temporal, as when a party sells a leasehold or a remainder interest in an asset, or “vertical,” as when a party sells a
ratable share of property so that the two owners share risk and reward as tenants in common. In their pure form, options are a division
of risk and reward for which the party bearing the risk without the
reward is appropriately compensated. In addition, ITM options become, in part, a horizontal or sequential transfer of ownership, much
as may occur in a partnership. This horizontal form of ownership divides the incidents of ownership according to who bears the first risk
and benefit, and who bears the rest. As previously explained, the
ITM portion is identical to a collar transaction, except that in a collar
the original property owner retains the first risk and benefit while
selling the last; while in the ITM portion of an ITM option, the original owner retains the last and sells the first.
The forward transfer of property that takes place in the ITM portion, if any, of an option has not been identified previously because the
payment arrangement between the parties to an option transaction
obscures it. This payment arrangement ensures that the option purchaser makes only one payment to the option seller (apart from a
payment in connection with the exercise of a call), and it reflects appropriate discounting at the risk-free rate because the payment occurs
on the option sale date, not the exercise date. But the payout structure
of any actual ITM option is identical to the payout structure associated
with a forward transfer of a portion of the underlier coupled with a
garden-variety OTM option. This structure explains why, even though
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non-ITM options are fundamentally different from forward sales as regards the portion of property disposed of, ITM options become partial
forwards and shade into full forwards at the limit.
Our realization-based income tax recognizes a difference between
“ordinary” and “capital” income—however tenuous or unstable the underlying concepts may be. In light of the difference, and assuming it
persists, the tax system ought to attempt to identify the portions of option transactions that qualify as ordinary or capital and tax them accordingly, assuming that administrative costs resulting from complexity and gamesmanship do not swamp the benefits that might arise from
a more accurate taxation of options. Part III offers one set of possible
solutions in light of these concerns, but it is by no means the only possible set. It also illustrates some of the tradeoffs that arise in any effort
to develop a workable system that taxes options in approximately the
“correct” manner, where “correct” is understood against a baseline of
realization-based taxation for risky returns generated by capital and
special rates and basketing rules for capital income.

